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This dissertation features a mixed-methods research design that tests whether 
outcomes seen so far show a clear public benefit after enacting highway public-private 
partnership (P3) enabling legislation into law.  For this dissertation, public benefit is 
measured via three sub-hypotheses: reduction in debt (H1), increased project innovation 
(H2), and leveraged potential (H3).  A statistical analysis is used to test H1 while 
hypotheses H2 and H3 are examined using a qualitative case study design comparing 
Texas and California.    
Results from the quantitative and qualitative portions of this dissertation suggest 
mixed evidence on whether states with P3 enabling legislation provide increased public 
benefit.  The quantitative portion of this study tests the impact of debt (H1) by 
conducting paired sample t-test of the average annual state obligations for highway 
projects in states before and after enacting P3 enabling legislation.   These results 
suggest a statistically significant increase in debt obligations after enacting P3 enabling 
legislation (p < .001).  On the contrary, qualitative results support H2 and H3: a clear 
majority of interviewees from both Texas and California report that P3 enabling 
legislation has benefitted the public by increasing project innovation (H2) and allowing 
additional leverage potential (H3).  Overall, interviewees from Texas and California 
continue to view P3s as one policy “tool” among a wider set of alternative delivery 




The mixed results of this study point to the need for additional research on P3 
enabling legislation.  In particular, there is a need to develop validated quantitative 
measures that assess the before and after effects of P3 enabling legislation.  A 
comprehensive, publicly-available data set of outcomes for transportation infrastructure 
projects—delivered via the conventional design-bid-build method versus alternative 
delivery methods— is sorely needed.  Further research in P3 enabling legislation will 
help ensure that academics and planners possess the tools necessary to measure 
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The introduction is organized into five sections, beginning with a discussion of 
the motivation behind the research. The explanation of the research design and my 
decision to pursue a mixed-methods study, grounded in literature, follows.  Next, I 
discuss the extrinsic benefits this research provides planners and public policy 
professionals, including limitations to the study and future research opportunities.  
Finally, I summarize how the contents of this dissertation are organized. 
 
Research Motivation 
For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States led the world in its 
investment in transportation infrastructure.  The early 19th century saw the expansion of 
the country’s waterway canal infrastructure.  Miles of new railroads were laid during the 
latter half of the 19th century.  Railroad infrastructure was crucial to linking newly 
annexed land in the West with industrial centers in the East (Pinkerton 2015).  
Waterways and canals served a vital link connecting cities in the East.  Together, these 
two infrastructure innovations facilitated a rapidly growing U.S. economy (Taaffe 1996).   
Despite this legacy of infrastructure-as-an-economic-necessity mindset, in recent 
years the U.S. has not kept pace.  Since 2013, the U.S. has spent below its annual 




other developed nations (The World Bank 2018).  This decline in infrastructure spending 
in the U.S. is a funding problem: dwindling federal, state, and local funding streams 
available for transportation projects are placing added pressure on state governments to 
meet growing transportation demand with fewer resources to keep pace.  This pressure, 
in turn, has led some state and local governments to leverage existing resources by other 
means.  Public-private partnerships, or P3s, are one such leveraging alternative.  While 
P3s have been used in developed countries throughout the world for decades, only 
relatively recently have U.S. states seriously considered P3s as a viable project financing 
and delivery method (Pula 2016). 
While defining what a P3 is varies by industry stakeholder, a 2004 Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA) report to Congress defined P3s as “a contractual 
agreement formed between public and private sector partners, which allows more private 
sector participation than is traditional (USDOT 2004).” 
After highway P3 enabling legislation was first enacted into law, the concept has 
spread quickly (Rall, Reed, and Farber 2010, USDOT FHWA 2018d).  Thirty-seven 
states across the U.S. now have some form of enabling statute in place (Boyer and 
Scheller 2018).  This is not a regional trend.  Small states and large states alike, in all 
corners of the country, have adopted some form of legislation that can allow for 
increased participation by the private sector.  The opportunity of partnering with the 
private sector to design, engineer, plan, and finance a transportation project—especially 
when the private sector promises to deliver projects cheaper and faster than the public 




As the number of state legislatures authorizing highway P3 projects increases, a 
greater need to understand if outcomes benefit the public exists.  Proponents of P3 
enabling legislation argue that it provides public benefit through alternative finance 
options that can transfer risk to the private sector, promote increased project innovation, 
and leverage private sector dollar potential (McKinsey and Company 2018, Friedman 
2016). 
Academics have studied P3 projects and the enabling statute authorizing them.  
For example, researchers have surveyed state transportation subject-matter experts on 
reasons why P3 enabling legislation is pursued (Chen, Daito, and Gifford 2016).  Other 
scholars have taken a more case-study focused approach examining outcomes resulting 
from individual P3 projects (Geddes and Wagner 2013, Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015).  
Additional notable scholars exist in this area (Boyer and Scheller 2018, Mintrom and 
Vergari 1998, Birkland 2014, Geddes and Wagner 2013).  Although studies do test some 
relationships between P3 enabling legislation and project outcomes, none to date have 
featured a systematic mixed-methods synthesis approach as proposed in this dissertation. 
With this research need in mind, the question this dissertation will answer is: have 
the outcomes observed in a state after P3 enabling legislation is enacted into law 
provided benefits to the public?  While benefits to the public is an unclear concept to 
measure, three sub-hypotheses, based on a review of the relevant literature, were 
developed: debt and/or risk transfer, increased project innovation, and leveraged private 
sector dollar potential (Chen, Daito, and Gifford 2016, Jacobson and Ok Choi 2008).  






For this dissertation, public-private partnership enabling legislation is defined as 
state legislation that allows for highway project contracts to be formed “between a public 
agency and a private sector entity that allow for greater private sector participation in the 
delivery and financing of transportation projects (USDOT FHWA 2018b).” 
This research features one overall hypothesis and three sub-hypotheses.  The 
overall hypothesis is the following: H(overall) = The outcomes seen in states show a clear 
and lasting public benefit after highway P3 enabling legislation was enacted into law.  
Public benefit is defined and divided into three sub-hypotheses.  The first sub-hypothesis 
(H1) is that states with P3 enabling legislation allowed for shifting debt and risk to the 
private sector and away from tax payers.  The second sub-hypothesis (H2) is that states 
with P3 enabling legislation saw projects that offered and allowed for greater innovation 
in the design and construction process by accessing private-sector ideas, skills, and 
talent.  The third sub-hypothesis (H3) is that states with P3 enabling legislation permitted 
the state to leverage private investment capital for major roadmap projects.  Thus, the 
null hypothesis (H0) can be defined as: none of the above sub-hypotheses matter in 
determining outcomes, as defined by benefit to the public, after P3 enabling legislation 
was enacted into law.   
This dissertation is a mixed-methods research design.  For the quantitative portion, 
I built a 50-state data set of demographic, political, administrative, and other relevant 




legislation benefits the public by allowing states to decrease debt and transfer risk to the 
private sector. 
Building on findings from the literature, the qualitative section focuses on two 
states with contrasting P3 experiences: Texas and California (Boyer and Scheller 2018).  
For these two case examples, I summarized the history and development of P3 enabling 
legislation in each state, including discussion of what has occurred since passage of the 
enabling legislative statute and explanation regarding the political and institutional 
differences as possible causes.  When and where possible, interviews were conducted 
with key personnel with inside knowledge of the development of P3 enabling legislation 
and what has occurred since.  This analysis is utilized to test the second and third sub-
hypotheses: P3 enabling legislation benefits the public by increasing project innovation 
(H2) and leveraging private sector dollar potential (H3). 
 
Research Extrinsic Benefits 
This research provides several extrinsic benefits.  By investigating these outcomes, 
planners and public policy officials can obtain insight on outcomes since states elected to 
pursue P3 enabling legislation.  Especially pertaining to the qualitative portion, this 
research provides clarity to how transportation P3 enabling legislation itself works. 
Insight into the process by which transportation public-private partnership 
enabling legislation was enacted into law helps educate state-level public policy officials 
across the U.S.  Such partnerships are so complex that entire teams of engineering, legal, 




clear unbiased understanding of how P3 enabling legislation has worked (or has not 
worked) to the benefit of the public, is currently lacking.  
This research provides private sector partners a clearer understanding of state 
enabling legislation, perhaps even effective best practices for navigating through it.  
Furthermore, the research helps contrast practices used in each state.  This dissertation is 
aimed to provide the academic community with insight into this fast-growing trend and 
how the urban planning discipline fits within it. 
Lastly, this study provides an aid to the public sector in understanding how P3 
enabling legislation benefits them.  P3 projects, and the associated legislation supporting 
them, is often politicized.  By providing in-depth unbiased assessment, this study will 
augment the general body of knowledge available to citizens and help provide clarity on 
the impact P3 enabling legislation offers the individual. 
 
Research Limitations 
One limitation to this dissertation research: a small number of states in the 
quantitative analysis (n=50) posed to be a challenge.  To account for the relatively small 
sample size, comparisons undertaken among states came from multiple differing 
perspectives.  Thus, the results from this study maintain a proper level of rigor for 
quality research. 
A second limitation involves the small number of states examined in the 
qualitative study. It is infeasible to document a detailed story of how enabling legislation 




the amount of work required outweighs the benefit.  For this reason, I selected case 
studies that were representative of the P3 landscape. 
A third limitation is, that while every effort was made to ensure the objective 
collection of qualitative data, it is not possible to ensure such interviews are free from 
bias. Transportation highway P3s can be a controversial topic. That P3s can be lucrative 
for financial and legal teams who help craft them and bring these projects to a close 
comprises an additional complicating factor.  As a result, public officials face immense 
pressure to adopt P3 enabling legislation favorable to them.  While attempting every 
effort to take this into account, it is important to recognize most parties involved in P3s 
are likely to have some sort of financial motivation. 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to make a value assessment on whether P3s, 
(and the enabling legislation making them possible) are smart public policy.  The 
objective is rather to systematically report on outcomes to the public benefit after such 
legislation has been enacted.  In doing so, this dissertation research aimed to shed light 
on the likely impacts and trends P3 enabling legislation had and will continue to have on 
the public as well as the planning profession in the future. 
 
Dissertation Report Organization 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters.  The five chapters that comprise 
the dissertation are summarized in the list below. 
1. Introduction.  This chapter covers the research motivation, design, extrinsic 




2. Literature Review.  This chapter provides a summary on the relevant literature 
surrounding the history and development of state highway transportation P3s.  
Complementing this effort, the literature synthesizes the pertinent theories 
explaining key ways in which policy diffuses across different states. 
3. Quantitative Analysis. This chapter provides a summary of the results from the 
quantitative research portion of this analysis. This section presents a review of 
major findings that emerged from the 50-state study of P3 enabling legislation.  
The first sub hypothesis is tested and results are discussed.   
4. Qualitative Analysis.  This chapter summarizes the qualitative results portion 
of the study, including a review of key points from stakeholder interviews and 
comparative results from the two case study states.  Results from the second 
and third sub-hypotheses are discussed.   
5. Conclusion.  This chapter synthesizes the results presented in Chapters II, III, 









This literature review covers several key aspects associated with the history and 
development of P3 enabling legislation.  The review provides a background on key 
theories behind the American federal system and how it has evolved over time.  A brief 
review on theories behind policy diffusion across states with a special focus on network 
linkages in the Texas Legislature follows. Differences in state innovation are then 
discussed.  Finally, this chapter concludes by reviewing the latest research on highway 
transportation P3s, including their use and some of the most recent academic studies on 
the topic. 
 
American Federal System 
Federalism, defined for the purpose here and as established under the U.S. 
Constitution, is often difficult to describe.  Federalism is perhaps best understood for its 
more contemporary description from the founders according to the U.S. Constitution of 
1787.  Generally, the federalist philosophy (in contrast to con-federalism, for example) is 
broadly outlined as a “relationship of shared authority between two levels of government 
(Kenneth 1946).”  Other scholars, such as Law (2013), considered the division of powers 
between these two levels of government to be more on “on equal status” than those 




The concept of federalism itself, perhaps one of the most fundamental areas of 
disagreements among the framers, has evolved over time.  During much of the 18th 
century, federalism was often assumed as less referring to an integrated, cohesive form 
of government and more of a term referring to a “compact” of individual, sovereign 
states.  This perspective even dominated much of the early writings by some (although 
certainly not all) of the country’s framers.  In Federalist 39, James Madison referred to 
the new nation as “neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of 
both (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 2003).”  This view began to change, as the term began 
to denote a more integrated form of government philosophy rooted in the belief that 
federalism works best when power is shared between the federal and state levels of 
government.  Such thinking was influenced by subsequent court cases, as famously 
occurred via the landmark 1803 U.S. Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison (Marbury 
v. Madison 1803). 
It is not a surprise, then, that a robust scholarly debate on how federalist systems 
are adopted remains. While many scholars have differing interpretations, Ziblatt (2006) 
provides a helpful compilation of the competing theories for federal systems (Ziblatt 





Table 1  Competing Theoretical Explanations of Federal System Adoption 
Theories Explanation 
Ideational Theories A greater degree of ideological commitment to decentralist ideas in 
society makes federalism more likely to be adopted. 
Cultural-historical 
Theories 
Federal institutions are more likely to be adopted in societies with 
culturally or ethnically fragmented populations. 
“Social contract” 
Theories 
Federalism emerges as a bargain between a center and periphery 
where the center is not powerful enough to dominate the periphery 




Federalism is likely to emerge when the subunits of a potential 
federation already have highly developed infrastructures.  For 
example, they are already constitutional, parliamentary, and 
administratively modernized states. 
Source: (Ziblatt 2006) 
 
 
While federalism has evolved, recent challenges are placing new pressures on the 
changing nature of federal/state relationships.  For example, the Great Recession of 2009 
resulted in serious declines in the fiscal health of state government, especially in states 
whose revenues rely primarily on sales taxes.  For the most part, states have still not 
experienced full recovery.  Declining state revenues, coupled with growing demands for 
services, have placed additional burdens on states.  Such trends support a key 
explanation behind the rise in transportation P3 enabling legislation. To this end, some 
suggest the evolving federalist structure has allowed for private infrastructure firms to 
take certain advantages from governments while remaining immune to many of the 







Policy Development and Customization 
The literature on policy development and customization is also relevant for the 
development of P3 enabling legislation.  While the academic literature does vary 
somewhat, the stages of the policy process generally follow four major processes (Karch 
2007): 
 agenda setting (i.e., process to determine which policy choice to pursue);  
 information generation (i.e., process where resources provide examples of 
existing programs);    
 customization (i.e., process where officials mold policy for political or technical 
reasons); and 
 enactment (i.e., process where officials decide to adopt or not adopt a policy). 
 
One of the most critical steps in the formulation of any legislative policy involves 
agenda setting.  Typically, there is no shortage in the number of policy ideas that any 
state legislator can be bombarded with at any given time.  The goal for elected officials 
is to decide which policy idea is worthy of advancement.  Lawmakers also receive a 
trove of requests from interested parties to consider their idea and advance forward.  
These interested parties may strive to have their voices or perspectives heard, with only a 
few gaining the traction to advance for further consideration. 
According to the literature, agenda setting is considered to be one of most critical 
stages of policy-making.  Schattschneider (1975) famously noted that the definition of 




can rarely agree on what issues are because power is involved. He who determines what 
politics is runs the country, because the definition of alternatives is the choice of 
conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power (Schattschneider 1975).”  This 
stage of the policy formation process is important not because it establishes which 
issues, problems, and solutions will gain broader attention; rather, it is critical because it 
helps to decide which ones will not. 
Perhaps as a result of the importance of agenda setting, the academic literature is 
replete with articles dissecting the mechanisms used (including how and when to use 
them) by groups to vie for power and have their position or point-of-view advanced.  
However, one aspect of agenda setting that clarifies how stakeholders maneuver and 
focus their time and resources involves the levels by which an agenda may be set.  
According to Birkland (2014), as the agenda is quite vast, it is advisable to think of 
many different levels in which an agenda may be set (Birkland 2014).  An alternative 
way to think about agenda setting is to distinguish between formal and informal agenda 
setting (Corduneanu-Huci, Hamilton, and Ferrer 2012), although the distinction may be 
less relevant in this context.  Regardless, as shown in Figure 1, according to Birkland 
(2014) there exists layers in which agenda seekers must get through in order to advance 
their interests forward (Birkland 2014).  The goal is to advance issues as close as 








Figure 1  Levels of the Agenda 
Source: Adapted from (Birkland 2014) 
 
 
The next step in the policy development process, information generation, is also a 
critical step at the state level—it’s the point at which state lawmakers gather information 
and become aware of policies taking place in other states.  Unfortunately, literature 
relating to the drivers of information generation is relatively limited.  A few important 
exceptions exist. Mossberger (2000) takes an in-depth look by examining how the spread 
of state enterprise zones from 1981 to 1993 impacted the process of adoption in five 




result of policy “fad” among a few early adopter states, Mossberger (2000) found that 
the federal government actively encouraged adoption by the states.  Furthermore, the 
research concluded that “in reality, federal activity encourages the formation of networks 
that include members of policy communities and the states themselves as multiple 
information sources (Mossberger 2000, 4-5).”  This provides additional insight into the 
notion that, in addition to policy diffusing horizontally across state legislatures during 
the information generation process, policy diffusion may be accelerated through changes 
at the federal level. 
Policy customization (i.e., the process by which policymakers take a proposal idea 
and mold it to fit their state’s context) is intuitively a critically important phase in in the 
policy diffusion process.  In the context of P3 policy, broadening authority for state 
DOTs to enter into tolling agreements with a private sector partner is one such example.  
Large states with a rapidly-growing population in key urban areas, such as Texas, would 
likely have little difficulty attracting private sector firms to offer bids to develop toll 
road projects.  For other states, such as Montana or Alaska, attracting private companies 
to bid on toll road projects may be more difficult.  While the diffusion of tolled policies 
is occurring in many U.S. states, it’s reasonable to suggest that some states may have to 
customize policies to fit within the context of their state, especially if the policy 
originated from a state with dissimilar characteristics. 
The literature on policy customization, however, is also limited.  Most policy 
diffusion research addresses ways that policy innovation gained enactment, while 




policy types and how they affect customization.  For example, states have wide latitude 
to enact and customize their approach in some policy areas (e.g., transportation policy), 
but are relatively limited in others due to federal policy requirements (e.g., healthcare).  
Despite this, recent studies like that from Hayes (1996) and Mooney and Lee (1999), 
have found that policy customization can be affected by the amount of controversy that 
policy faced in other states (Hays 1996, Mooney and Lee 1995)  
Finally, while significant work has occurred in this area of policy innovation, some 
of the most influential and comprehensive work was accomplished by Karch (2007).  
Using a mixed- methods approach, Karch (2007) tests a number of conventional theories 
that explain policy adoption by utilizing five recent policy innovations: (1) senior 
prescription drug programs, (2) medical savings accounts, (3) individual development 
accounts, (4) time limits, and (5) family caps.  Table 2 below summarizes key 





Table 2  Common Theories Explaining Policy Diffusion and Enactment 
Theory Summary of Theory Key Literature 
National 
intervention theory 
A national crisis causes states to 
consider prompt action 




Geographically proximate states 
will consider policies adopted by 




A state’s willingness to adopt 
policy innovations if a problem in 
that state is serious enough 
Sapat (2004) 
State wealth theory Wealthy states are more capable 
of taking policy risks than poor 
states 




More professional legislatures 
have the resources and time to 
innovate new policy 
Squire (2007); Kousser 
(2005) 
Ideology theory Political ideology influences the 
adoption of policy innovation 
Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, 
and Peterson (2004) 
 
 
The literature summarized in Table 2 also contributes to a more comprehensive 
understanding why policy or a set of policies might diffuse from one state to another, 
Karch (2007) found that each of these theories, when isolated, had limited predictive 
power.  However, Karch (2007) concludes by suggesting that many of these theories 
might be insufficient.  Ultimately, Karch (2007) argues that the policy formation and 
diffusion process typically have different causal agents can affect the prospect of 
diffusion—something he supports through a far more comprehensive examination of 
state health and social welfare policy (Karch 2007). 
Karch’s findings discussed above are also evident in transportation policy.  State 
legislatures, often with significant help and guidance with the state executive branch, are 




revenues to state and local transportation agencies in charge of constructing and 
maintaining the state’s transportation system. 
The literature summarized in Table 2  also explains how transportation funding 
policy diffuses among states.  For example, despite a national transportation funding 
crisis, only a handful of states are actively seeking ways to raise additional transportation 
revenue (Mark Niquette 2017).  While it is possible that some states are sharing 
innovative practices--the state of Washington recently considered adopting Oregon’s 
VM Fee pilot program framework--most neighboring states compete rather than share 
many of their best practices and lessons learned (Washington State Transportation 
Commission 2016). 
Perhaps a more appropriate understanding of policy diffusion among all 50 state 
legislatures is to recognize the differences and complexities associated with each.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the state executive branch in 
helping to form and shape transportation funding policy, and crucially, the significant 
influential role the state executive branch possesses to influence members of the 
legislative branch (and vice versa).  One notable example involves the $142 billion 
Trans-Texas Corridor (TTC) plan championed by then Texas Governor Rick Perry 
(Batheja 2014).  Only after members of the Republican-led state legislature began to 
receive immense pressure from their constituents did the plan lose momentum.  In 2009, 
six years after the plan initially rolled out to the public, the proposal was dropped 




Perhaps in ways critical to understanding our modern interpretation of federalism, 
policy diffusion also forms a critical basis by which policy may be shared with other 
states.  Inherent in our federalist structure is the ability for states to develop and 
disseminate policies which work well.  It is this feature of federalism that Justice 
Brandeis noted in his landmark 1932 decision regarding the ability for states to serve as 
“laboratories” of policy innovation (Gardner 1995). 
The scholarly study of policy diffusion in the context of federalism is rich, with 
many scholars examining how policies diffuse across the U.S. federalist system.  For 
example, do policies that start in one state diffuse to others that are close to them or that 
align to them politically?  Do “good” policies diffuse to other states while “bad” policies 
do not, or is this notion too simplistic or naïve?  Finally, if a critical number of states 
adopt a good policy, does it eventually make its way toward consideration by Congress?  
While various scholars have explored such questions in length, findings are mixed at 
best. 
Perhaps the best synthesis of the literature pertains to relatively recent work by 
Shipan and Volden (2012.)  The authors provide the following seven lessons for policy 
diffusion in the U.S. federalism context (Shipan and Volden 2012): 
 policy diffusion is not (merely) the geographic clustering of similar policies;  
 governments compete with one another;  
 governments learn from each other;  
 policy diffusion is not always beneficial;  




 policy diffusion depends on the policies themselves; and 
 decentralization is crucial for policy diffusion. 
 
As discussed previously, simple explanations regarding policy diffusion (e.g., 
ideology theory, national intervention theory, etc.) are singularly insufficient to explain 
diffusion which occurs within state transportation funding policy enactment.  However, 
Shipan and Volden’s (2012) seven lessons offer useful insight in explaining policy 
diffusion in the context of transportation funding policy.  The first lesson, policy 
diffusion is not simply the clustering of similar policies by how close two states are to 
one another, is evident in how P3 policy has spread throughout the U.S.  For example, 
that enabling legislation for P3s would cluster in a region of the country with significant 
presence of construction firms specializing in this type of alternative project delivery 
makes intuitive sense.  Six of the largest contracting firms that specialize in alternative 
project delivery are nearly all located in either California or the East Coast (Tulacz 
2017).  However, many leading states for transportation public-private partnerships, such 
as Texas, Virginia, and Florida, are located outside of these regions.  Therefore, 
regionalism is an insufficient explanation for policy diffusion. 
The second lesson, that governments compete with one another, is also applicable 
in explaining how transportation funding policy diffuses across states and downward 
from the federal level.  That states compete vigorously among one another for employers 
to locate within their jurisdiction is no secret.  In fact, many states and cities will 




abatements to companies willing to locate part or all of their operations within their 
state.  As part of this process, states may also tout the availability of transportation as 
one key benefit they provide a prospective employer.  Such competition was evident 
most recently with the competitive bidding process by states and cities surrounding the 
possible location of Amazon’s second headquarters.  A total of 238 states and cities 
submitted bids for the chance to have Amazon locate a proposed $3.7 billion facility in 
their state (Amazon 2017).  Such jurisdictional competition is also evident through 
USDOT’s Transportation Investments Generating Economic Recovery, or TIGER, 
discretionary grants.  In 2018, hundreds of state and local governments competed for a 
share of $500 million in discretionary grant funding (USDOT 2018b). 
While local governments compete vigorously for their “share” of transportation 
funding, data also indicates that state governments learn from each other.  Critically, it is 
the area of policy learning where the importance of networks is most vital.  
Transportation policy experts work closely with several Washington, DC-based 
associations, such as the American Association of State Transportation Officials and the 
Transportation Research Board, as well as Denver-based National Conference of State 
Legislatures to share best practices on transportation policy. 
Other lessons of Shipan and Volden (2012) prove instructive.  The benefits of 
policy diffusion are not always mutually shared; this is also true in the diffusion of 
transportation policy (Shipan and Volden 2012).  More of the country’s population is 
beginning to cluster in fewer places. As a result, policy pushes for increasing transit 




Sparsely populated states, who might otherwise contribute a portion of their federal tax 
revenues to the federal government may not likely see those funds returned for transit 
services. As purported by Shipman and Volden, the importance of politics, government 
capabilities and decentralization are also evident in transportation funding policy.  For 
example, nearly all of the innovation occurring in new methods for promoting private 
participation in transportation started at the state level, absent any federal oversight or 
direction (USDOT 2004).  Only after innovator states, such as Texas and Virginia, began 
to formulate and refine a P3 framework was the idea considered by Congress (Kenney 
2017).  While the seven lessons of Shipman and Volden (2012) prove instructive, an 
additional critical component to the diffusion process comprises the role of networks.  
While brief discussion occurred regarding this role, additional attention is necessary. 
The study of policy networks generally focuses on the way governmental and 
non-governmental institutions are linked together to advance a particular policy forward.  
For example, Rhodes (2008) provides a definition for policy networks as “sets of formal 
institutional and informal linkages between governments and other actors structured 
around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy making and 
implementation (Rhodes 2006).”  As can be inferred, the role of networks in explaining 
how policy diffuses across governments is significant.   
As with policy diffusion, research insights on policy networks struggle with the 
same inherent problem: how do you define it?  Several scholars provide useful 
perspectives on how best to interpret the form and function of policy networks.  Börzel 




thought: (1) “typology of interest intermediation” (i.e., relationship between state and 
societal interests) and (2) “specific form of governance (Börzel 1997).”  Several scholars 
also describe interest intermediation, with many sharing a common perspective that 
policy networks are best viewed as relationships between interest groups and 
government.  Other scholars, such as work by Atkinson and Coleman (1989), view six 
types of policy networks along two dimensions: 1) the “state structure, in terms of 
autonomy and concentration of power” and 2) the “capacity to mobilize the interest of 
employers (Atkinson and Coleman 1989).” 
Perhaps a more straight-forward understanding is an interpretation of these 
networks as a specific form of government.  Through this perspective, policy networks 
are understood more as separate but interdependent organizations that seek to coordinate 
their actions through shared resources and shared interests (Börzel 1997).  Essentially, 
from this viewpoint, understanding how policy networks function can explain the 
interests and motivations of actors.  As noted previously, the role of networks in the 
development and diffusion of transportation funding policy is relevant.   
An in-depth evaluation of networks within Texas further supports this theory.  
For example, of members of the Texas Legislature face pressure from several networked 
groups wholly outside of state government.  Figure 2 illustrate these networks further 
and help to highlight the number of pressures that members of a state legislature can 
face.  Table 3 provides examples of networks influencing the Texas legislature in 
































Table 3  Examples of Networks Influencing the Texas Legislature on Transportation 
Funding Issues 
Organization Type Examples Information to Legislature 
Academic Institutions Texas A&M Transportation 
Policy Center, University of 






American Association of State 
Transportation Officials, 
American Road Transportation 
Builders Association, 
Association of General 
Contractors 
Feedback from industry 




HDR Inc., Kimley-Horn, Flour Industry interests; industry 
best-practices  
Municipal Representatives City of Bryan, City of College 
Station, City of Mesquite 
City interests; state/local 
partnership interests 
Bond Attorneys Bracewell Law, Boyle & 
Lowry LLP 
Financing and funding 




Texas Toll Party, Texas 
TURF, Texans for No New 
Debt! 




BikeTexas, A New Dallas, 
Houston 2040. 




These outside organizations have extensive networks of volunteers, donors, and 
institutional knowledge, working to influence their member of the Texas state legislature 
to guide the future of Texas funding policy.  Not all networked organizations have 
intrinsic interests or are seeking to shape the direction of transportation funding policy.  
Some, such as academic institutions, aim to provide aid in the analysis of a topic and, in 
doing so, help to ensure they maintain good relationships with powerful members of the 
state legislature.  Other organizations, such as bond attorneys and 




sure Texas continues to invest in transportation.  Municipal interests, not surprisingly, 
seek to ensure the interests of their cities are adequately represented in the Legislature.  
Finally, liberal and conservative grassroots organizations are typically comprised of 
active and involved citizens.  These mobilized citizens hold protests and bring awareness 
to issues of importance to them.  For conservative groups, in recent years, this has meant 
voicing opposition to pro-toll road legislation.  For liberal groups, for example, this 
involved the push for Democratic lawmakers to introduce legislation for tearing down 
the overpass through Central Dallas (Formby 2017).  These outside networked groups 
seek to mobilize resources to influence state transportation funding policy, especially 
during the policy enactment phase. 
The previous discussion on policy diffusion and policy networks warrants a key 
question: if policy diffusion is so common, why are some state legislatures more 
innovative than others?  It’s certainly true that many state legislatures do not have full-
time legislatures, while others lack the research staff to undertake a critical review of 
sophisticated public policy. Nevertheless, it is unclear that professional legislatures 
boasting competent staff have resulted in more creative, effective, or outcome-oriented 
legislation. 
Various scholars have attempted to offer possible reasons why some states 
practice innovative strategies, while others “imitate” these state policies.  One such work 
by Schultz (2012), in building on landmark work conducted by Karch (2007), provides a 
series of mixed-method surveys and analytical analyses finding that state governments 




2007).  Specifically, Schultz (2012) offers three possible reasons why most state 
legislatures simply “imitate” rather than create and enact fundamentally new policy: 
 Policymakers are often under immense pressure to offer innovative policies to 
show they’re thinking “outside the box”.  Since many state lawmakers lack the 
time or resources to conduct deep policy analysis, Schultz (2012) argues, 
lawmakers are forced to use analyses conducted elsewhere.  Often, these analyses 
are tailored specifically for the state in which that analysis was conducted and ill-
suited elsewhere. 
 Forming a consensus is time-consuming and difficult.  While it’s extremely 
challenging to accrue and gather the necessary information for developing a 
policy, building the legislative support necessary proves a greater challenge. It is 
in this environment that the most feasible policies advanced are incremental 
ones—big, large changes are nearly impossible. 
 Many legislators are captured by “failed public policy myths.”  Shultz (2012) 
notes that despite the failures of many state policies, policy myths (e.g., tax 
breaks to companies result in net new job creation, voter fraud is a serious 
problem, etc.) continue to be promulgated across state legislatures.  These myths, 
according to Schultz (2012), are even sometimes perpetuated by outside lobbying 
and other interest groups.   
 
In reviewing how Texas first enacted its transportation public-private partnership 




pressures to deliver a new framework for private participation in project delivery. As 
previously discussed, this outside pressure was initially more from Governor Perry’s 
office than from outside networked groups.  However, it’s not exactly clear if there were 
strong outside networked pressures pushing on the Governor to enact the sweeping 
Trans-Texas Corridor plan.  The close coordination between key committee members 
from both the House and Senate suggested that the problem of growing transportation 
congestion (the state just grew by 22 percent from 1990-2000) was only going to get 
significantly worse (Texas State Demographer 2014).  State lawmakers were under 
immense pressure, from both their constituents and the Governor’s office, to deliver.  
Lawmakers, in borrowing lessons learned from a 1995 public-private partnerships law 
enacted in Virginia, worked quickly to imitate and customize this innovative set of 
policies for Texas (Garvin and Bosso 2008). 
From that point forward, however, the Trans-Texas Corridor faced immense 
opposition.  Part of the reason for this was the extreme difficulty of forming a durable 
consensus for the project as well as a coalition to support it.  Large land owners and 
ranchers in the state directly in the path of the proposed project began to organize and 
mobilize quickly in opposition.  In addition, much of the proposal path bypassed large 
urban areas, giving little reason for those in the state’s fast-growing urban areas to 
support the plan.  Complicating matters, the project consortia were led by Cintra, a 
Spanish-based firm.  This effort caused many grassroots groups to further mobilize in 
opposition (Hall 2006).  The ambitious proposal simply presented too much change too 




This example suggests that Texas was a policy innovator—partly because the 
legislature was forced to develop fundamentally new policy approach in responding to 
exploding population growth.  In doing so, Texas state legislators examined other high-
growth states and customized those practices to something that would fit in Texas.  But 
in other ways, the state was a policy imitator, borrowing an existing policy framework 
already enacted into law in Virginia.  This is a clear example of how a complex mix of 
forces worked together to simultaneously force innovation (Karch 2007). 
It still isn’t clear exactly why Texas decided to innovate in this area.  One 
explanation might be that the right confluence of forces came together to push Texas 
legislators to leadership in the early 2000s.  Nevertheless, despite TTC being “wiped 
from the books,” Texas is considered a policy leader by other states wishing to pursue 
P3 enabling legislation.  Key information experts that helped to craft the original TTC 
law in Texas are sought out by legislative staff in other states for their expertise, helping 
to ensconce Texas’ reputation as a policy innovator in public-private partnership 
legislation.  According to the FHWA, as of August 2018 a total of 37 states, the District 
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have enacted some form of legislation that enables the use 
of several different P3 approaches for the delivery of transportation infrastructure 
(USDOT FHWA. 2018c).      
This analysis illustrates, using the example of transportation funding policy, 
ways in which a policy can diffuse from one state to another under the U.S. federalist 
system.  While some scholars have posited reasons why some policies diffuse elsewhere, 




probably insufficient.  The better explanation is probably that it is still unclear why some 
states become innovators in a policy area.  For Texas, important lessons around a key 
area of transportation policy came via painful lessons learned through an ambitious, but 
ultimately fateful, $130 billion Trans-Texas Corridor proposal. 
 
Public-Private Partnerships as State Policy 
The pros and cons of private infrastructure are best explained first through a 
historical context of the U.S. experience in privatization of infrastructure.  
Transportation funding policy is complex, involving a mix of federal, state, local, and 
private stakeholders.  In addition to each level of government playing a role, much of the 
transportation funding policy is modal in nature.  Highway funding involves mostly state 
funding, with significant federal and local participation. Whereas waterway and port 
funding has participation mostly at federal and local levels.  Finally, minor but important 
differences among states, particularly regarding how state DOTs participate in non-
highway transportation modes, is evident and is discussed later in this dissertation. 
The early roads in America were pothole-ridden and in poor shape.  This is 
perhaps a result of funding through local or private means.  In fact, some of the first 
roads were built by developers with some of the early facilities even receiving a 
substantial return on their early investments (Gunderson 1989).  This mode of funding 
was common for much of the early 19th century; by 1810, it was estimated that New 
England had around 300 turnpikes.  However, by 1830 it was clear this model was 




result, more regional approaches to fund road projects began to take shape.  Large 
linkages of communities began to form coalitions to levy and spend money for regional 
roadways. 
By the mid-1800s, and especially during the post-Civil War era, a number of toll 
road companies entered into default.  Consequently, a change in funding philosophy 
began to take shape.  After the Civil War, the responsibility of paying for good roadway 
infrastructure was viewed as a more communal responsibility.  This shift was brought 
about mostly by the inability of the toll model approach to meet funding demands but 
also by the broader increased demand for more surface transportation.   
Waterways and railroads were the dominant form of transportation.  However, 
two major limitations were shared with both modes: they were relatively limited and 
inflexible.  Road transportation was increasingly seen as a more viable infrastructure 
worthy of community investment.  As such, these roads (and their use) began to increase 
steadily over the latter part of the 18th century. 
The era of funding roadways through public-good based revenue sources didn’t 
begin until the turn of the 20th Century.  During the early 1900s, the introduction of the 
automobile significantly increased the demand for better roads.  Bicyclists and farmers 
also voiced strong support for paved roadways, complaining about the often-tenuous 
conditions of the current rural roadways.  During this time, many interest groups, such as 
the Good Roads Association, the American Automobile Association, began to push for 
state involvement in roadway funding (Parker 1912).  However, a serious conversation 




It was also during this early period that economic analysis was first used to 
justify a transportation project.  Mayors of small towns often questioned why their 
residents should be required to pay for a roadway.  Sensing such disagreements could 
stall road projects, Good Roads Association president John Bankhead argued that higher 
quality roadways were a worthwhile long-term investment, especially as a means to 
facilitate trade and commerce (Paxson 1946).  Such an argument became easier over 
time as vehicle ownership increased. 
Momentum for investing in the nation’s road network began to increase 
significantly with the passage of the Post Office Act of 1912, the Federal Aid Road Act 
of 1916, and the Federal Highway Act of 1921.  The Post Office Act, predicated 
primarily on the basis that ensuring the efficient delivery of mail relied on good roads, 
was one of the first examples of federal involvement in roadway construction.  This bill 
provided a $500 million appropriation for an “experimental construction of highways 
(Williamson 2012).”  The 1916 Act, the first bill that dealt specifically with 
appropriations for roads, also was funded to ensure roads in rural areas were in good 
enough quality to could serve as a precursor to federal highway legislation.  The 1921 
Federal Highway Act provided a five-year funding program (an increasingly evident 
need given the time frame for planning for highway projects) and $75 million to be 
distributed to states on a matching basis (Weingroff 1996).  Many features of this Act, 
including both the matching requirement and the multi-year funding horizon, involved 





During the 1920s and 1930s, roadway construction continued to progress, with 
developments in gravel that improved the condition of roadways.  Just as notable, during 
this time U.S. military leaders, sensing the growing worry about rising international 
conflicts in Europe and Asia, began to see the role of an interconnected network of 
highways as critical for military mobilization.  Partly for this reason, the federal role for 
transportation (as both a key standard enforcer and funding source) began to emerge.     
It is from this point that the U.S. entered an era of unprecedented direct public 
investment in its transportation infrastructure network.  From the early 1920s on through 
the mid to late 20th century, the U.S. embarked upon several large and ambitious 
highway infrastructure building programs, with the landmark Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1956 serving to “fuel” the infrastructure construction that would occur throughout the 
rest of that century (Weingroff 1996).  This legislation was also the catalyst for the 
construction of the interstate highway network.  This network, which consisted of a 
vision of 41,000 miles of new highway to better link the still-recovering post World War 
II nation.  Critically, this legislation allocated $26 billion—an unprecedented 
commitment of public investment at the time—to be paid for through a combination of 
fees levied on a “per-use” basis (Childs 1989).  This funding scheme was 
operationalized through a federal per-gallon tax levied on all gasoline and diesel motor 
fuel.  The scheme would serve as an enormously successful mechanism in part because 
of the significant year-over-year growth in gasoline consumption.  Funding sources 




However, two structural limitations posed long-term problems with this funding 
scheme (Denison and Eger III 2000).  First, the federal tax (and nearly all state gas 
taxes) was a tax based on consumption, not price.  This meant that as the price of 
gasoline increased, the rate of consumption remained the same.  During the latter part of 
the 20th century, this rarely posed a challenge as consumption was growing at such a fast 
rate.  In fact, consumption was so rapid that revenues were able to offset the inevitable 
decline in purchasing power.  While lawmakers increased the federal gas tax rate a total 
of 14 times since it was first enacted in 1932, it has not changed since 1993 (Bickley 
2012).  The second, longer-term factor was a steady increase in the average passenger 
vehicle fuel economy.  This meant that by the mid to late 1990s, more drivers were 
going further from each gallon of gasoline or diesel purchased.  As a result, the total 
number of miles traveled on U.S. roadways, or vehicle-miles traveled (VMT), increased 
significantly while federal and state fuel taxes grew at an anemic rate.  Together, these 
factors set the stage for a growing imbalance between exploding transportation demand 
and the funding available to address that demand. 
Several other factors also placed pressure the current fuel tax system.  Most of 
these pressures were political.  For much of the latter 20th century, increasing the gas tax 
rate has long been viewed negatively by both liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning 
lawmakers alike (Agrawal and Nixon 2017).  Conservatives viewed a gas tax increase as 
an additional burden on an already overtaxed population, while liberal-leaning groups 
viewed a gas tax as regressive—one that puts even greater problems on already 




trucking industry, such as the American Trucking Association, have worked to defeat 
past attempts at a federal gas tax increase.  Recent signs suggest these groups may have 
begun to reconsider that position (Talev 2017). 
These factors together resulted in significant declines in public revenues 
available to fund necessary capital and operations costs for the nation’s infrastructure 
system.  While problems experienced in the U.S. highway industry are the most acute, a 
similar pattern of chronic underinvestment in public transit, aviation, inland waterway, 
and other transportation modes has also occurred.  Many public officials responsible for 
managing the nation’s transportation infrastructure have turned to other means to 
improve their cash flows and maintain assets.  One area that officials have considered a 
revisit of the nation’s model of funding infrastructure improvements from the late 
1800s—through private participation.  In recent years, many public officials have 
considered ways in which the public still retains ownership of the transportation 
infrastructure asset but can leverage and monetize it.  Such partnerships, called P3s, have 
been used historically in the provision of real estate development with cities for many 
years—often not without controversy (Koppenjan and Enserink 2009).  Despite these 
challenges, recent indications suggest that public-private partnerships will likely be 
considered by public officials for the provision of transportation infrastructure in the 
future. 
As was briefly discussed previously, benefits and limitations are inherent with 
P3s.  As state and local officials continue to explore P3s, many find they aren’t “free 




such a deal is structured, P3s often involve a “concession” of some form to occur.  As 
shown in Table 4 below, many of the benefits from a P3 may involve a trade-off that 
multiple parties must then consider.  As shown in Table 4 below, many of the benefits 
from a P3 may involve a trade-off that multiple parties must then consider. 
 
 
Table 4  Public-Private Partnership Benefits and Limitations 
Public-Private Partnership Benefits Public-Private Partnership Limitations 
 Private financing and project 
acceleration 
 Potential monetization of existing 
assets 
 Potential project cost and time 
savings 
 Possible project lifecycle 
efficiencies or improvements 
 Opportunity for improved project 
quality over traditional methods 
 Possibility for transfer of certain 
project risks to the private sector 
 Assurance in most cases of public 
control and accountability of 
project 
 Possible loss of public control and 
flexibility 
 Possible unreasonable private profits at the 
public’s expense  
 Perceived loss of future public revenues 
 Potential risk of bankruptcy or default 
 Accountability or transparency concerns 
 Potential environmental review issues 
 Foreign companies 
 Public-private partnership toll road issues 
and accountability 
 Potential for some contract terms to be 
unfavorable to the public sector 
Source: Adapted from (Farley and Norboge 2014) 
 
 
The first benefit is the potential for private financing and, in some cases, project 
acceleration.  For example, some scholars have posited that through innovative financing 
mechanisms, the P3 project delivery approach can help advance the delivery of a project.  
For the public-sector partner, this results in a project that can be delivered faster than the 
public sector might normally be able to.  A private sector contractor is responsible for 




concessionaire agreement, an equity investor might require that one or more contractors 
on a project will be required to deliver the project ahead of schedule and within budget 
according to pre agreed-upon terms.  Any cost or schedule overruns might negatively 
affect the equity investor(s).  A review of the available evidence does suggest that, 
overall, P3s do result in accelerated project delivery.  For example, a recent report by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation found instances where using a P3 to deliver a 
transportation asset could help to reduce inconvenience by the traveling public through 
traffic disruption and help to improve public safety (USDOT 2004). 
Second, P3s can be structured to help create a new cash flow, or monetize, an 
existing asset a governmental entity already owns.  From a public-sector perspective, the 
monetization of assets might provide additional revenue streams into the transportation 
revenue account.  This is especially true for existing assets, known as brownfield assets.  
There is some evidence to support this theory (GAO 2008). 
There is also evidence of the potential for cost and time benefits related to the P3 
delivery method.  While scholarly evidence of P3 project outcomes in the United States 
is relatively limited, a recent quantitative study found evidence of improvement of 
project time savings for alternative delivery methods relative to the traditional design-
bid-build method (Chasey, Maddex, and Bansal 2012).  As cited in this and in other 
literature, possible reasons for time and cost savings from the public-sector perspective 
could be due to the direct incentives to the private contractor, use of best-practice 
performance-based contracting methods, bidder competition, and proper and efficient 




Maddex, and Bansal 2012).  It is worth noting, however, that this relatively small 
universe of completed projects can be limiting to proper before-and-after analysis. These 
authors note that it is not correct to draw generalized conclusions based on a single study 
alone. Results discussed in this study and in other literature do potentially point to more 
effective control of project schedules among projects that are delivered through the P3 
approach relative to more traditional transportation project delivery approaches (Chasey, 
Maddex, and Bansal 2012).  From a private sector contractor and equity investor 
perspective, this likely indicates that risk must be diligently managed to ensure that 
schedule and cost requirements are met. 
As discussed previously, there is also evidence suggesting the P3 method can 
result in lifecycle efficiencies through better use of lifecycle cost analysis.  As defined 
by the USDOT, lifecycle cost analysis generally refers to an approach involving a total 
cost comparison of competing design (or preservation) alternatives for a transportation 
project (Ozbay et al. 2004).  A recent study found that, through more efficient use of this 
analysis process, P3s “can save from 6 to 40 percent of the cost of construction and limit 
the potential for cost overruns (USDOT 2004).” 
In addition to improvements in lifecycle costs analysis, there is evidence 
suggesting that P3s can result in improved project quality and facilitate the transfer of 
risk from a public sector agency to one or more private sector partners.  From the public-
sector perspective, this means more innovation provided from a private sector partner.  
This also means that a private sector partner must be able to bring “more to the table” for 




P3 agencies, researchers at the University of Minnesota found the use of the alternative 
project delivery method has led to incentivizing project innovation (Zhao, Saunoi-
Sandgren, and Barnea 2011). 
Furthermore, in some cases, a transportation P3 contract can allow for the 
effective transfer and management of risk.  This transfer of risk means that the public 
sector no longer is required to manage it.  However, there are trade-offs for this.  Often, 
the private sector will demand project equity or additional payments for taking this risk 
on.  The available research does suggest that this risk transfer can work. For example, 
some scholars have shown that the transfer of risk from the public sector to the private 
sector can encourage the public sector to more efficiently manage project risk and, in 
some cases, potentially lessen the possibility of potential future financial losses. 
Furthermore, the preemptive consideration and planning of likely future risks, which is 
usually required in the development of a P3 project, can help to improve the likelihood 
of positive overall project outcomes (Zhao, Saunoi-Sandgren, and Barnea 2011).  
Indeed, a 2009 UK National Audit Office study found that the potential for benefits from 
the transfer of risk usually depend on “careful project analysis and public sector 
enforcement of a P3 agreement (UK National Audit Office 2009).” 
Although some transportation scholars have cautioned that infrastructure P3s can 
potentially reduce public control over publicly owned infrastructure assets, others note 
that these innovative project delivery methods can sometimes improve the ability for 
public agencies to hold the private sector partner accountable for meeting certain 




have made tenable cases supporting this theory.  For example, some scholars have noted 
that most public-private partnership negotiations tend to be based on a “strong, 
performance-based contract that spells out all of the responsibilities and performance 
expectations that the government will require of the contractor.  The failure to meet any 
of the thousands of performance standards specified in the contract exposes a contractor 
to financial penalties,” concluding that “the public interest is protected by incorporating 
enforceable, detailed provisions and requirements into the contract (Gilroy 2009).”  
Other experts have found supporting evidence suggesting that under a typical P3 
agreement, the public sector does not risk the loss of project ownership or control of a 
facility if the project negotiations are “well-crafted and properly enforced (Buxbaum and 
Ortiz 2009).”   Furthermore, some suggest that deal terms can be done in a way that will 
help to ensure the public is adequately protected (Buxbaum and Ortiz 2009). 
As is the case with many areas, there are also several limitations inherent in 
transportation P3s.  The first concern with P3s is the possible reduction in public control 
in transportation project.  There are an increasing number of examples of public 
concerns growing over a “take-over” of a public asset (Danielle Ivory 2016).  There are 
even examples of changing terms in P3 contracts to reflect this growing concern.  For 
example, some countries in Europe have limited the maximum term length for P3 
agreements to only 35 years (Jeffers et al. 2007).  From the private sector perspective, 
these term limits can pose challenges for long-term planning.  Other scholars, however, 




of a transportation facility are usually addressed in P3 contracts (Buxbaum and Ortiz 
2009, Jeffers et al. 2007). 
Similar to concerns of a private sector “take-over” of public infrastructure, other 
scholars have raised the possibility of private sector companies collecting an 
“unreasonable” profit.  These scholars suggest that private concessionaires could make 
profits “at the public’s expense” by demanding unreasonably high tolls and fees for 
transportation facility use, neglecting operations and maintenance of a transportation 
facility, or requiring to be compensated for lost revenue (Buxbaum and Ortiz 2009, 
Grimsey and Lewis 2005). 
Other concerns are more financial in nature: the potential for loss of future public 
revenues is one such concern.  Again, there is some evidence to support parts of this 
claim.  According the U.S. GAO, higher financing costs relative to financing costs only 
available to the public sector can, in certain circumstances, result in higher overall 
project costs (GAO 2008).  Conversely, other scholars have argued that these such issues 
can be addressed and mitigated through asset valuation changes and more effective 
negotiation of agreements related to risk-sharing (Rall, Reed, and Farber 2010). 
The risk of bankruptcy or default through a public-private partnership is another 
major concern—one underscored most recently with the bankruptcy and subsequent debt 
restructuring of State Highway 130 Segments 5 and 6 in Central Texas (Lovegrove 
2016).  While the public perception of P3s was damaged as a result, the private sector 
ultimately took on the financial loss as part of the structured agreement with TxDOT, the 




risk that a private P3 partner could default on a project, negatively affecting the fiscal 
and social well-being of the public.  This issue is especially pertinent with regard to P3s 
in which the public sector might be at ultimate financial risk or could otherwise could be 
required to make a remuneration to a private sector partner in the event of a default 
(Temple-West 2010). 
Although preserving confidentiality during the negotiation of a P3 agreement can 
be essential in certain circumstances, from the public sector perspective some scholars 
and practitioners have voiced concerns regarding the transparency of such a process 
(Urahn 2009).  For example, a survey of state DOTs found that 70 percent of those that 
responded noted that transparency was an important measure that was inherently in the 
public’s best interest (Buxbaum and Ortiz 2009).  Several studies, including the GAO, 
identified P3 agreements completed without public oversight and identified several 
options for improving the transparency and openness of the process. Ultimately, the 
GAO found that an open process that gives all stakeholders opportunities to provide 
input could be one best practice that public agencies could integrate into their proposal 
solicitation and evaluation process (GAO 2008).  While many in the public argue that 
little evidence is available that suggests an open process is always followed, many large 
consortia argue otherwise.   
Several issues have also been brought up regarding the role that environmental 
procedures are properly followed through an alternative project delivery method, such as 
a P3.  For example, some scholars have raised concerns that parties in these agreements 




Association 2006).”  However, other scholars have noted that recently many P3 have 
included environmental performance standards that the private concessionaire is required 
to meet (Buxbaum and Ortiz 2009).  Furthermore, due to the state of the nascent U.S. 
transportation P3 industry, many foreign companies will often be the ones that seek to 
participate in a large P3 bid.  As a result, some scholars have raised issues related to 
involvement by a foreign company or consortia, suggesting that only U.S.-based firms 
should be allowed to bid. 
Finally, other issues exist regarding the confusing nature by which transportation 
infrastructure is paid for by the public.  For example, many have argued that publicly 
funded transportation facilities, such as state roads that receive some or all of its funding 
through more traditional funding mechanisms (e.g., gas taxes, vehicle registration fees) 
should not be monetized via a toll. To gain public support, some scholars have argued 
that benefits from a toll on that road need to be clearly communicated (Smith 2013).   
To the extent possible, these statements were supported with evidence from peer-
reviewed studies.  Generally, while a public sector agency could benefit from the 
transfer of risk to one or more private sector partners, this is not without a concession to 
the private sector contractor or equity investor.  With the transfer of any type of risk, the 
public sector (and the taxpaying public) may find itself “better off” by no longer having 
financial responsibility for the liabilities of maintaining and operating a long-term 
transportation asset.  Regardless, the pros and cons of any private investment 





Relevant Literature Findings 
This literature review covered several key aspects associated with topics related to 
this dissertation.  First, a background on key theories behind the American federal 
system and how it has evolved over time was provided. Next, this dissertation presented 
a brief review on theories of policy diffusion across states with a special focus on 
network linkages in the Texas Legislature.  Finally, latest research on highway 
transportation P3s, their use, and some of the most recent studies on the topic was 
presented. 
Based on a review of literature, a few key findings emerged.  First, the way P3 
enabling legislation has been adopted over time can be explained by all four competing 
theories behind federalism at work simultaneously.  For example, the way P3 enabling 
legislation has diffused across different states rather than through one single federal law 
shows ideationist theories of federalism.  In other words, the literature findings suggest 
that decentralist ideas in a society (i.e., state P3 policy, at least initially) can, in some 
cases, make federalism more likely to function.  Simultaneously, a direct legacy of the 
colonial structure in the pre-federalist American federal system is represented in 50 state 
DOTs overseen by 50 different state legislatures. This is explained best through the 
“infrastructural powers” theory that notes that federalism will emerge “when the 
subunits of a potential federation already have highly developed infrastructures (Ziblatt 





A second key finding is the importance of agenda setting—especially within the 
context of whether a state eventually adopts P3 enabling legislation.  A cursory review 
of this legislation suggests that the time P3 legislation is first proposed in a state 
legislature to the time it is eventually enacted into law is short.  While this does not 
confirm the theory that putting the issue of P3s on the agenda is the most difficult part of 
the process, it does suggest that state legislatures appear efficient at moving the issue 
through their respective chambers.  This is noteworthy for P3 policy.  While it is true 
that many state legislatures do revisit their P3 enabling legislation years and even 
decades after the initial enabling legislation is passed, rarely if ever do state legislatures 
decide to go in a fundamentally different direction. 
The six policy diffusion theories presented in this literature review is also 
instructive for explaining how P3 enabling legislation spread from just a handful of 
states in the early 2000s to over three-dozen in 2018.  Based on a cursory timeline of 
when states adopted their P3 enabling legislation, some theories (e.g., problem severity, 
state wealth, ideology) appear far more relevant in explaining this spread than others 
(e.g., legislative professionalism, neighboring state, national intervention). 
Finally, this literature review explored the history of P3 legislation itself.  While 
this discussion focused on the institutional actors involved with Texas P3 enabling 
legislation, it is reasonable to suggest that similar actors also participated in the 
development of P3 enabling legislation in similar ways in other states.  Relatedly, this 




method itself.  While there are certainly opportunities for additional research, the 








This chapter provides three sections of analysis: descriptive, exploratory, and 
testing of H1.  First, a descriptive analysis is provided reviewing the history and 
diffusion of transportation P3 enabling legislation policy across the U.S.  Next, I cover 
the statistical methods used for an exploratory analysis as well as H1.  The results are 
then provided.  I conclude this chapter by discussing the results and offering possible 
implications for the future of P3 enabling legislation outcomes. 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
As discussed previously, 37 U.S. states, Puerto Rico, and the District of 
Columbia have enacted some form of highway P3 enabling legislation.  As shown in 
Figure 3 below, states that have enacted public-private partnership enabling legislation 
are diverse: they are located in all four U.S. Census designated regions, include large 
states with a large number of lane miles and smaller states with fewer lane miles 
(USDOT FHWA 2018c).  As shown in Figure 3, no clear geographic pattern explain 








Figure 3  States with Enabling Statutes for P3s 
Source: (USDOT FHWA 2018c) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3, FHWA categorizes highway P3 enabling legislation into 
three types: “broad,” “limited,” or “none.”  States with “broad” enabling legislation are 
those that, generally, do not significantly limit the number or authority of state or local 
entities to enter into P3 agreements.  “Limited” enabling legislation, by contrast, are 
states whose statute restricts the number or authority of state or local agencies to enter 
into P3 agreements (USDOT FHWA 2018c).  Finally, states with no state statute 
authorizing P3 agreements are denoted as “none.”  As shown in Table 5 below, state 
statutes in 23 states (46 percent) grant “broad” authority for state or local agencies to 
enter into highway P3 agreements, whereas another 14 states (28 percent) grant 










Description Total # of 
States 
Broad State statute does not significantly limit the number or 
authority of state or local agencies to enter into P3 agreements 
23 (46%) 
Limited State statute restricts the number or authority of state or local 
agencies to enter into P3 agreements 
14 (28%) 
None No state statute authorizing P3 agreements 13 (26%) 
 Source: (USDOT FHWA 2018c)  
 
 
As shown in Table 5, 74 percent of states have enacted either “broad” or “limited” 
P3 enabling legislation.  However, a majority of P3 project activity occurred in only a 
handful of places.  According to Public Works Financing’s Major Projects Database, 
more than half (62 percent) of all highway P3 projects, completed or proposed, have 
occurred in just seven states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia (Reinhardt 2018).  For the purposes of this analysis, completed 
projects are those that have reached financial close (i.e., all of the project agreements 
have been signed and approved and all of the conditions contained in the project and 
financing documents were met.)  Proposed projects are those that were considered but 
never reached financial close.  Table 6 below shows the number of P3 deals, completed 





Table 6  Highway P3 Projects Completed or Proposed, as of August 2018 
State Proposed Completed Total % of Total  
Arizona 7 5 12 5% 
Arkansas 1 0 1 0% 
California 9 15 24 9% 
Colorado 4 7 11 4% 
Connecticut 0 1 1 0% 
District of Columbia 1 2 3 1% 
Florida 10 24 34 13% 
Georgia 4 3 7 3% 
Illinois 3 1 4 2% 
Indiana 1 6 7 3% 
Louisiana 1 0 1 0% 
Maine 1 0 1 0% 
Maryland 1 2 3 1% 
Massachusetts 1 6 7 3% 
Michigan 2 1 3 1% 
Minnesota 0 5 5 2% 
Mississippi 1 3 4 2% 
Missouri 2 1 3 1% 
Nevada 2 2 4 2% 
New Jersey 0 1 1 0% 
New Mexico 0 3 3 1% 
New York 0 4 4 2% 
North Carolina 3 14 17 7% 
Ohio 3 4 7 3% 
Oregon 1 1 2 1% 
Pennsylvania 4 1 5 2% 
Rhode Island 0 1 1 0% 
South Carolina 1 6 7 3% 
Texas 9 33 42 16% 
Utah 1 6 7 3% 
Virginia 5 16 21 8% 
Washington 0 4 4 2% 
West Virginia 3 2 5 2% 
Total 81 180 261 100% 
Source: (Reinhardt 2018) 
 
There are several possible reasons why a majority of P3 activity occurs in just 
seven states.  Numbers in the exploratory analysis of this study demonstrate these states 




growing suburbs around large cities, they have faced the most pressure from growing 
vehicle demand.  Another possibility is that firms in these states have the technical 
expertise to deliver projects through alternative project delivery means.  Further research 
is needed to establish a more complete understanding of the relationship between these 
variables and P3 enabling legislation. 
As shown in Figure 4 below, states that have seen the most P3 activity all have 
enacted some form of P3 enabling legislation into law and have had this legislation “on 
the books” for at least a decade or more.  Three notable examples of projects completed 
in areas without P3 enabling legislation stand out:  New Mexico, New York, and Rhode 
Island.  While further research is needed to understand this phenomenon, several 
possible explanations emerge.  First, it could be that legislators in these three states 
foresaw a favorable political environment for P3 projects to move forward in the absence 
of state enabling legislation (Hamm and Moncrief 2012).  In other words, the political 






Figure 4  Major P3 Projects Proposed and Completed, 1990-2018 
Source: (Reinhardt 2018) 










































Figure 5 below provides a cumulative histogram of the number of U.S. state or 
territories first enacting P3 enabling legislation by year.  A majority of states enacted 
their P3 enabling legislation after 2001.  However, after a slow period during the early 
2000s, by the late 2000s state legislatures again began to enact P3 enabling legislation.  
In 2009 alone, for example, five U.S. states or territories—Arizona, Georgia, Maine, 




Figure 5  Cumulative Histogram of P3 Enabling Legislation Year First Enacted into 
Law 






Theory, Data, and Methods 
Prior to evaluating H1, I began with an exploratory analysis testing a series of 
conditions that, according to the literature, help explain the differences between states 
that adopt P3 enabling legislation and states that do not.  I evaluated descriptive statistics 
as well as a series of two-sample t-tests.  I first constructed a 50-state dataset of 
demographic, political, administrative, and other relevant characteristics.  My 
independent variables included the presence or absence of P3 enabling legislation and 
the type of P3 enabling legislation enacted into law.  The paragraphs that follow provide 
a detailed explanation of expected relationships with the independent variable and 
provide supporting literature. 
The first relationship explored is the rate of population growth.  States that grow 
faster are also more likely to adopt P3 enabling legislation (Albalate, Bel i Queralt, and 
Geddes 2018).  Therefore, it is expected the percent population growth will be greater 
among states that have P3 enabling legislation in place when compared to states that do 
not.  This is partly because states experiencing high population growth are also likely to 
face increased pressure to explore other leveraging tools such as P3s (Rall, Reed, and 
Farber 2010).  The dependent variable used to measure this relationship is the percent 
change in population from 2010 to 2017.  Data used to develop this dependent variable 
were obtained from data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (US Census Bureau 2018). 
In addition to population growth, total state population has also been shown to 




states face pressure to develop alternative highway project delivery methods to connect 
their large population together (Rall, Reed, and Farber 2010).  Therefore, states with a 
large population are more likely to consider P3 enabling legislation (Rall, Reed, and 
Farber 2010).  As a result, I expect the total state population to be greater in states with 
P3 enabling legislation when compared to states with no P3 enabling legislation.  The 
dependent variable used to measure this relationship is the total state population in 2017.  
Data used to develop this dependent variable were obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (US Census Bureau 2018). 
A recent analyses notes that the number of state lane miles could also be related 
to P3 enabling legislation adoption (Rall, Reed, and Farber 2010).  This argument 
postulates that states with more total lane miles face greater demand for operations and 
maintenance funding and, therefore, have less funding available for new construction 
projects.  Thus, states with large amounts of existing lane miles are more open to P3 
enabling legislation as another tool to deliver new projects.  This allows states to budget 
transportation revenues for maintenance and operation obligations instead (Siemiatycki 
2009).  Consequently, it is expected the total state lane miles to be greater in states with 
P3 enabling legislation when compared to states with no P3 enabling legislation.  The 
dependent variable used to measure this relationship is total number of state lane miles 
in 2017.  Data used to develop this dependent variable were obtained from the American 





Next, I examined legislative characteristics.  According to the literature, states 
with several transportation entities place added pressure on their state legislatures to 
provide additional leveraging tools for finance and delivery of transportation projects, 
including P3s (Chen, Daito, and Gifford 2016).  In many states regional and county toll 
authorities also may play a role in infrastructure delivery; consequently, these states may 
be more interested in having alternative project delivery tools (Tran, Harper, and 
Minchin Jr 2017).  Accordingly, I expect the number of state transportation entities in 
2017 to be greater in states with P3 enabling legislation when compared to states that do 
not  The dependent variable used to measure this relationship is the total number of state 
transportation entities, and data used to develop this dependent variable were obtained 
from AASHTO (AASHTO 2016). 
Previous research has posited that the number of state legislative committees 
with jurisdiction over transportation may matter in explaining whether a state was 
successful in adopting its P3 enabling legislation (Munaya 2010).  In this case, the 
relationship is negative: the mean number of transportation-related legislative 
committees is lower for states with P3 enabling legislation when compared to states that 
do not.  At first, this relationship might seem counter-intuitive.  However, past research 
has shown that a larger number of policy actors can contribute to failed passage of policy 
(Karch 2007).  This is especially true for complex policy, such as P3 enabling legislation 
(Rall, Reed, and Farber 2010).  The dependent variable used to measure this relationship 




2017.  Data used to develop this dependent variable were obtained from AASHTO 
(AASHTO 2016).  
This literature also suggests that it is possible key financial considerations might 
play a role in whether a state enacts P3 enabling legislation.  One financial consideration 
is the amount a state DOT spends to build and maintain its roadway network.  Past 
studies suggest that states with higher levels of DOT expenditures tend to face less 
pressure to consider P3s for new construction projects.  However, there is some 
disagreement among scholars on whether there is merit to this claim (Rall, Reed, and 
Farber 2010).  The dependent variable used to measure this relationship is the total 
authorized DOT expenditures in 2017.  Data used to develop this dependent variable 
were obtained from AASHTO (AASHTO 2016). 
Previous studies theorize that states with large state transportation revenues have 
the resources required to build and maintain their state’s highway network.  Therefore, 
they do not see as strong a need to pursue P3 enabling legislation (Rall, Reed, and Farber 
2010).  I expect states with P3 enabling legislation to have less state transportation 
revenues when compared to states that do not.  To conduct this test, the dependent 
variable is the total state revenue for transportation in 2017.  These data were obtained 
from AASHTO (AASHTO 2016). 
The amount of state debt is one key determinant why states might want to pursue 
P3 enabling legislation (DiNapoli 2013).  For example, some scholars note the problems 
that debt can pose for state DOTs, especially if a portion of total state revenues must go 




amounts of state debt still need to meet roadway demand; therefore, they are more likely 
to enact P3 enabling legislation.  Given this, I expect total debt obligations outstanding 
to be greater in states with P3 enabling legislation than states with none.  To conduct this 
test, I used total state debt obligations outstanding in 2017 as my dependent variable.  
Data used to develop this dependent variable were obtained from AASHTO (AASHTO 
2016). 
Finally, according to the literature, the total amount of distance traveled is 
positively related to whether a state enacts P3 enabling legislation (Munaya 2010).  This 
relationship makes sense: the more drivers travel in a state, the greater the demand for 
new roadway projects.  In turn, state legislators will be more likely to face increased 
pressure to respond.  Given this, I expect total number of vehicle kilometers traveled in 
2017 to be greater in states with P3 enabling legislation than states that do not.  To 
conduct this test, I used total vehicle kilometers traveled in 2017 as my dependent 
variable.  Data used to develop this dependent variable were obtained from AASHTO 
(AASHTO 2016).  All dependent variables used in this analysis and the data sources for 






Table 7  Exploratory Analysis Data Sources and Variables 
Data Source  Variable  
U.S. Census Bureau  
Percent Change in State Population from 2010-2017 
Total State Population in 2017 
AASHTO Transportation 
Governance and Finance: A 
50 State Review of State 
Legislatures and DOTs 
Number of State Lane Miles in 2017 
Number of State Transportation Entities in 2017 
Number of Legislative Committees with Jurisdiction over 
Transportation in 2017 
Authorized State DOT Expenditures in 2017 
Total State Revenue for Transportation in 2017 
Authorized State Debt Obligations Outstanding in 2017 
Number of Annual Vehicle Kilometers Traveled in 2017  
Source: (US Census Bureau 2018, AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
Table 8 below summarizes the variables tested in this exploratory analysis. A “+” 
in the “Expected Mean Difference (Yes – No)” column indicates the expected mean 
difference between states with and without P3 enabling legislation as positive.  
Conversely, a “-” in the “Expected Mean Difference (Yes – No)” indicates an expected 
negative relationship.  As outlined above, these expectations are founded in the 
literature.   The dependent variable, expected mean difference, and rationale is 









(Yes – No) 
Rationale 
Percent Change in 
State Population 
from 2010 to 2017 
+ States experiencing high rates of population growth 
are also facing increased pressure to make their state 
friendlier toward incentivizing P3 projects because 
they are facing immense growth in demand with 
relatively small increases in transportation revenues.   
Total State 
Population in 2017 
+ Heavily populated states, which also tend to be highly 
urbanized, face pressure to find alternative ways to 
deliver highway projects to connect their large metro 
areas together. 
Number of State 
Lane Miles in 2017 
+ States with more lane miles face greater demands for 
operations and maintenance funding and have less 
available for new construction projects, so they are 
more open to incentivizing P3s. 
Number of State 
Transportation 
Entities in 2017 
+ A review of P3 project data shows that these projects 
tend to be delivered by more than just the state DOT; 
in many states, regional and county toll authorities 
also play a role.  Therefore, a relationship between the 
number of state transportation entities and the P3 




Jurisdiction in 2017 
- Past research has found that P3s tend to be highly 
complex.  Therefore, the more “players” in the 






- States that have higher levels of DOT expenditures 
face less pressure to consider P3s for new 
construction projects. 
Total State Revenue 
for Transportation in 
2017 
- States that have greater authorized state revenues 
available for transportation face less pressure to need 
P3s as an alternative. 
Total State Debt 
Obligations  in 2017 
+ States with greater debt on their books are more likely 





+ States that have higher overall vehicle distance 
traveled face greater demand for highway P3 projects. 
Source: (Rall, Reed, and Farber 2010, Karch 2007, Albalate, Bel i Queralt, and Geddes 







I first reviewed descriptive statistics.  As shown in Table 9 below, the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum value is presented for all eight variables 
tested in the exploratory analysis. 
Several notable findings emerge from these descriptive results.  First, the percent 
change in state population from 2010-2017 ranges from a minimum of -2.07 percent in 
West Virginia to +12.1 percent growth in Texas.  Interestingly, both states have enacted 
P3 enabling legislation.  Furthermore, total state population in 2017, total state lane 
miles in 2017, authorized state DOT expenditures in 2017, total state transportation 
revenue in 2017, total state debt obligations outstanding in 2017, and annual vehicle 
kilometers traveled in 2017 varied for each state.  This variance is not surprising: states 
themselves vary significantly.  For example, California has a population of almost 40 
million and P3 enabling legislation enacted into law.  This is nearly 80 times greater than 
Wyoming, a state that has not enacted P3 enabling legislation. Appendix 1 provides 






Table 9  Descriptive Statistics of Exploratory Analysis Variables 






2010 to 2017 0.0462737 0.0378452 -0.0207397 0.121345 
Total State 
Population in 
2017 6,500,504 7,345,270 579,315 39,776,830 
Number of State 
Lane Miles in 
2017 171,017 121,236 3,428 777,575 
Number of State 
Transportation 















in 2017 $2,970,000,000 $3,000,000,000 $372,000,000 $11,000,000,000 
Total State Debt 
Obligations in 




2017 100,000,000,000 105,000,000,000 5,800, 000,000 547, 000,000,000 







Next, I compared the mean of states with P3 enabling legislation with the mean 
of states without P3 enabling legislation for each variable.  Table 10 below summarizes 
the results from this test. 
With respect to Table 10, several observations emerged.  First, states with P3 
enabling legislation in place had mean values greater than states without P3 enabling 
legislation for all nine variables tested.  This was not expected.  As discussed in Table 8, 
I expected the mean to be lower for states with P3 enabling legislation for the following 
three variables: legislative committees with jurisdiction over transportation in 2017, total 
authorized state DOT expenditures for 2017, and total state transportation revenues for 
2017.  These preliminary observations suggest further research may be needed to more 





Table 10  Mean Differences by P3 Enabling Legislation 







Percent Change in State 
Population from 2010 to 2017 .0473741      .0431418     0.0042322 
Total State Population in 2017 7,505,068 3,641,360      3,863,709 
Number of State Lane Miles in 
2017 181,067 155,307   25,760 
Number of State Transportation 
Entities in 2017 2.135135   1.461538 0.6735967 
Legislative Committees with 
Transportation Jurisdiction in 
2017 4.378378 3.307692 1.070686 
Total Authorized State DOT 
Expenditures in 2017 
 
$3,760,000,000 $1,970,000,000 $1,790,000,000 
Total State Revenue for 
Transportation in 2017 $3,430,000,000 $1,940,000,000 $1,490,000,000 
Total State Debt Obligations in 
2017 $1,470,000,000 $817,000,000   $654,000,000 
Annual Vehicle Kilometers 
Traveled in 2017 120,000,000,000 51,200,000,000 68,800,000,000 
Source: (AASHTO 2016, US Census Bureau 2018) 
 
 
Next, I conducted a series of t-tests to understand whether these differences are 
statistically significant.  Table 11 compares the t-value (i.e., size of the difference 
relative to variation), mean difference (i.e., difference between states without P3 
enabling legislation and states with P3 enabling legislation), and p-value (i.e., probability 
that there is a statistically significant difference between states that do not have P3 






Table 11  P3 Enabling Legislation T-Test Results 
Variable  T-value  Mean Diff. P-value  
Percent Change in State Population from 
2010 to 2017 -0.3437 -.0042322 0.7326 
Total State Population in 2017 -1.6605 -3,863,709      0.1033 
Number of State Lane Miles in 2017 -0.6617 -25760.43     0.5934   
Number of State Transportation Entities in 
2017 -0.9554 -0.6735967 0.1721 
Legislative Committees with Transportation 
Jurisdiction in 2017 -1.5747 -1.070686     0.1219 
Total Authorized State DOT Expenditures in 
2017 -1.5946 -$1,790,000,000     0.1176   
Total State Revenue for Transportation in 
2017 -1.4833 -$1,490,000,000 0.1455 
Total State Debt Obligations in 2017 
-0.7300                
 
-$654,000,000     
  
   0.4689 
Annual Vehicle Kilometers Traveled in 2017 -2.1014 -68,800,000,000        0.0409*   
Note: * denotes statistically significant at p <0.05 
 
 
The results presented in Table 11 above show that annual vehicle kilometers 
traveled in 2017 was the only statistically significant difference observed.  This 
observation is consistent with the findings in the literature: states with higher overall 
greater vehicle travel also are more likely to have enacted P3 enabling legislation 
(Munaya 2010).  For all other insignificant results, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.  This is inconsistent with the literature findings.  Further explanation of these 






Theory, Data, and Methods 
The quantitative analysis of this dissertation will empirically examine H1, debt 
and risk transfer.  There are not enough available data to conduct an effective 
comparison of project innovation (H2) and leverage potential (H3).  Thus, H2 and H3 will 
be examined further in the qualitative analysis.  Figure 6 below provides a visual 
illustration of the hypothesis (H1) that will be examined as it relates in the context of the 




Figure 6  H1 Debt and Risk Transfer 
 
 
Operationally, H1 addresses one reason why state lawmakers seek to enact P3 
enabling legislation: reduction in overall debt.  Much has been written about this topic, 
with some suggesting that P3s can in certain circumstances reduce the debt load states 
take on by shifting risks away from the public sector (Geddes and Wagner 2013).  As 
discussed previously, Albalate et al. (2018) and have tested outcomes observed after 




2018, Boyer and Scheller 2018).  Based on the literature, I expect the average annual 
state obligations outstanding for highways to decrease after a state enacts its P3 enabling 
legislation. 
To test this hypothesis, I conducted a paired two-sample t-test comparing the 
average annual state debt obligations for highway projects in the five-year period prior to 
enacting P3 enabling legislation to the time period after P3 enabling legislation was 
enacted.  As shown in Table 12, I defined a timeline period of before, during, and after 
for each state that has P3 enabling legislation enacted into law.  The before period was 
measured as the five years prior to enacting P3 enabling legislation, the “lag” period was 
defined as the 2 years after legislation was enacted, and after was measure from the end 
of the “lag” period to 2017.  This “lag” period was included because research has shown 
that public policy tends to take at least one year to be fully implemented (Karch 2007, 
Montjoy and O'Toole 1979).  Due to the way this study was designed, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Kentucky, and New Jersey were not included in this analysis.  
This is because these states had just enacted their state’s P3 enabling legislation and 





Table 12  P3 Test Period by State 
State 
Five Years Before P3 
Enabling Legislation 
Enacted into Law "Lag" Period 
After P3 Enabling 
Legislation Enacted 
into Law 
California 1983 – 1988 1989 – 1991 1992 – 2017 
Florida 1985 – 1990 1991 – 1993 1994 – 2017 
Texas 1985 – 1990 1991 – 1993 1994 – 2017 
Illinois 1986 – 1991 1992 – 1994 1995 – 2017 
Minnesota 1987 – 1992 1993 – 1995 1996 – 2017 
South Carolina 1988 – 1993 1994 – 1996 1997 – 2017 
Delaware 1989 – 1994 1995 – 1997 1998 – 2017 
Oregon 1989 – 1994 1995 – 1997 1998 – 2017 
Virginia 1989 – 1994 1995 – 1997 1998 – 2017 
Alabama 1990 – 1995 1996 – 1998 1999 – 2017 
Colorado 1990 – 1995 1996 – 1998 1999 – 2017 
Indiana 1991 – 1996 1997 – 1999 2000 – 2017 
Louisiana 1991 – 1996 1997 – 1999 2000 – 2017 
Wisconsin 1992 – 1997 1998 – 2000 2001 – 2017 
North Carolina 1996 – 2001 2002 – 2004 2005 – 2017 
Nevada 1997 – 2002 2003 – 2005 2006 – 2017 
Washington  1999 – 2004 2005 – 2007 2008 – 2017 
Alaska 2000 – 2005 2006 – 2008 2009 – 2017 
Missouri 2000 – 2005 2006 – 2008 2009 – 2017 
Utah 2000 – 2005 2006 – 2008 2009 – 2017 
Arkansas 2001 – 2006 2007 – 2009 2010 – 2017 
Mississippi 2001 – 2006 2007 – 2009 2010 – 2017 
Tennessee 2001 – 2006 2007 – 2009 2010 – 2017 
West Virginia 2002 – 2007 2008 – 2010 2011 – 2017 
Arizona 2003 – 2008 2009 – 2011 2012 – 2017 
Georgia 2003 – 2008 2009 – 2011 2012 – 2017 
Maine 2003 – 2008 2009 – 2011 2012 – 2017 
Massachusetts 2003 – 2008 2009 – 2011 2012 – 2017 
Michigan 2004 – 2009 2010 – 2012 2013 – 2017 
Connecticut 2005 – 2010 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2017 
Ohio 2005 – 2010 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2017 
Pennsylvania 2006 – 2011 2012 – 2014 2015 – 2017 
Maryland n/a n/a n/a 
New Hampshire n/a n/a n/a 
Oklahoma n/a n/a n/a 
Kentucky n/a n/a n/a 
New Jersey n/a n/a n/a 
Note: “n/a” denotes insufficient data available to conduct a fair “after” comparison. For this reason, 
Maryland, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Kentucky, and New Jersey were not included in this 
analysis. 




To measure debt and risk transfer, I used average annual state obligations 
outstanding for highways as a proxy.  The numbers were adjusted to account for the time 
value of money, thus, all data are shown in 2018 dollars (Clemons and McBeth 2015). 
Results 
Table 13 compares average annual state obligations outstanding for highways 
five years before a state enacted its P3 enabling legislation into law, during the two year 
“lag” period, and afterward. Only seven states saw their average annual obligations 
outstanding for highways decrease after they enacted P3 legislation: Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, and West Virginia. The remaining 26 






Table 13  Average Annual State Obligations Outstanding for Highways Before, during 















Alabama $213,252,000 $81,184,000 $185,505,000 -$27,747,000 
Alaska $64,272,000 $203,513,000 $235,434,000 $171,163,000 
Arizona $2,026,448,000 $3,023,231,000 $3,004,125,000 $977,677,000 
Arkansas $531,821,000 $566,972,000 $563,103,000 $31,283,000 
California $265,216,000 $556,222,000,000 $5,181,669,000 $4,916,453,000 
Colorado $586,181,000 $0 $1,159,638,000 $573,456,000 
Connecticut $3,558,422,000 $3,802,034,000 $4,127,439,000 $569,016,000 
Delaware $877,654,000 $1,246,816,000 $1,870,584,000 $992,930,000 
Florida $2,351,776,000 $5,162,977,000 $8,300,907,000 $5,949,132,000 
Georgia $2,437,175,000 $3,907,293,000 $435,768,000 -$2,001,407,000 
Illinois $3,281,248,000 $3,964,050,000 $5,664,516,000 $2,383,268,000 
Indiana $1,032,349,000 $992,388,000 $2,942,430,000 $1,910,080,000 
Louisiana $2,295,021,000 $827,967,000 $1,761,521,000 -$533,501,000 
Maine $474,677,000 $581,791,000 $539,128,000 $64,451,000 
Massachusetts $9,034,245,000 $9,642,672,000 $9,795,160,000 $760,915,000 
Michigan $2,243,890,000 $2,646,718,000 $2,147,140,000 -$96,750,000 
Minnesota $760,746,000 $127,724,000 $677,960,000 -$82,786,000 
Mississippi $518,519,000 $267,965,000 $827,809,000 $309,289,000 
Missouri $490,737,000 $1,502,882,000 $3,052,654,000 $2,561,916,000 
Nevada $52,188,000 $258,093,000 $659,932,000 $607,744,000 
North Carolina $179,101,000 $248,341,000 $1,400,412,000 $1,221,311,000 
Ohio $38,901,000 $2,394,384 $3,433,701,000 $3,394,800,000 
Oregon $218,014,000 $63,419,000 $1,266,656,000 $1,048,642,000 
Pennsylvania $5,547,982,000 $10,635,401,000 $13,054,416,000 $7,506,434,000 
South Carolina $9,751,000 $10,633,000 $917,824,000 $908,073,000 
Tennessee $0 $0 $0 $0 
Texas $737,532,000 $6,491,738,000 $11,600,521,000 $10,862,989,000 
Utah $1,433,162,000 $1,285,033,000 $2,481,728,000 $1,048,567,000 
Virginia $1,541,729,000 $1,490,978,000 $2,975,039,000 $1,433,311,000 
Washington  $1,679,989,000 $3,084,017,000 $6,965,425,000 $5,285,436,000 
West Virginia $793,491,000 $730,068,000 $536,401,000 -$257,090,000 
Wisconsin $1,147,863,000 $1,214,443,000 $2,469,170,000 $1,321,307,000 





Results for the paired two-sample t-test are shown in Table 14.  The mean 
difference was $1,629,366,000 and the standard deviation was $2,610,202,000.  The t-
value was -3.5859 and the p-value was 0.0011.  The results are statistically significant: I 
can reject the null hypothesis and conclude the mean difference is positive. 
 
 
Table 14  Paired Two-Sample T-Test of Average Annual State Debt Obligations 
Outstanding for Highways Before and After P3 Enabling Legislation 
Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
These results show that, for the time period tested, average annual state 
obligations outstanding for highways did not decrease after a state enacted its P3 
enabling legislation.  Rather, the opposite occurred.  This study does not account for 
outside influences that could impact average annual state debt obligations for highway 
projects.  Thus, it is impossible to conclude that P3 enabling legislation was the cause of 
this increase.  However, this study does not provide evidence that P3s reduce average 
annual state debt obligations for highways.  As discussed earlier, seven states did see a 
P3 Enabling 









Before 32 1,408,660 322,677.8 1,853,643 751,386.3 2,065,933 
After 32 3,038,025 591,425.5 3,397,481 1,833,331 4,242,720 
       








decrease in average annual state debt obligations outstanding for highways.  The 
remaining 26 states, however, saw an increase. 
 
Discussion 
This analysis explored the relationship between P3 enabling legislation and the 
outcomes observed.  Building on work done by Albalate et al. (2013), Geddes (2018), 
and Boyer (2018), this analysis assessed whether a state’s P3 enabling legislation 
provided a clear benefit to the public. 
The findings presented in this chapter suggest key differences before and after a 
state enacts its P3 enabling legislation.  Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that a 
state is far more likely to pursue P3 projects once it has enabling legislation in place.  
While three states delivered P3 projects before enacting P3 enabling legislation, this 
appears to be the exception rather than the rule.  For the most part, states have their 
enabling legislation in place before pursuing a P3 project.  Finally, this research 
compared whether states that have P3 enabling legislation “on the books” are better able 
to shift risks and debt on to the private sector.  For this test, too, there does not appear to 
be any significant decline in average annual state debt obligations among states that have 
enacted P3 enabling legislation.  The primary challenge in this analysis were the 
availability of data.  Data as far back as 1983 were required to do a proper before-and-
after comparison on the effects of P3 enabling legislation.  This research found a major 
need for future research that can measure P3 enabling legislation outcomes while taking 








Complementing the quantitative analysis in Chapter III, the aim of this chapter is 
to report findings from P3 subject-matter experts in two key case study states.  This 
chapter begins by summarizing the reasons I selected Texas and California as my two 
case study states.  Next, I discuss the history and development of conditions and factors 
leading up to the passage of P3 enabling legislation for each state.  I then discuss the 
results from my remaining two hypotheses, H2 and H3.  I conclude by providing a 
discussion of those results.  For this research, I followed all IRB protocol and have 
anonymized responses to maintain confidentiality of the interviewee. 
 
Case Study Selection 
These two states were selected both for their similarities and differences.  
Regarding their similarities: Texas and California are both highly populated, urbanized 
states.  In 2017, California had a population of 39.5 million, making it the most 
populated state in the U.S. and home to the 2nd and 7th largest metropolitan area by GDP.  
With the second-largest population in the U.S., Texas is not far behind with a population 
28.3 million and home to the 5th and 6th largest metropolitan area by gross domestic 
product.  Furthermore, both states first enacted their P3 enabling legislation around the 




However, the differences between both states are also important.  One difference 
is terrain: California is home to multiple mountain ranges that often straddle the state’s 
largest metropolitan regions while all of Texas’s largest metropolitan areas are located 
on mostly flat terrain.  This difference is relevant for transportation policy: developable 
land is plentiful near Texas’s largest cities, allowing for un-throttled, sprawling suburban 
development.  Sprawl is relatively more limited in California, especially near the Los 
Angeles and San Francisco Bay areas. In this context, then, transportation policy is a 
direct result of each state’s geographic realities.  
In addition to terrain differences, political party control is also notable.  Since the 
early 1990s, after both states adopted their P3 enabling legislation into law, power by 
political parties diverged in opposite directions.  From the early 1990s to today, 
Democrats have taken full control over both chambers of the California Legislature.  By 
comparison, during this same time period Republicans have taken control of the Texas 
Legislature.  Democrats and Republicans now have a state government “trifecta”—one 
party controls both branches of the state legislature and the governor’s mansion—in 












California’s early P3 enabling legislation statutes were first signed into law in 
1989 by then Governor Pete Wilson.  Specifically, this legislation made changes to 
Section 143 of the California Streets and Highways Code.  The early version of this 
legislation was comprehensive: it allowed for Caltrans and local transportation agencies 
to enter into many types of P3 agreements.  Specifically, California Assembly Bill 680 
authorized Caltrans to “solicit proposals and enter into agreements with private entities, 
or consortia thereof, for the construction by, and lease to, private entities of four public 
transportation demonstration projects, at least one of which shall be in northern 
California and one in southern California (Baker 1989).” 
Following the passage of this legislation, Caltrans entered into two P3 
agreements—State Route 91 and State Route 125—both tolled facilities located in 
Southern California.  In 1996, legislative changes were made that further expanded the 
ability for local governments to enter into P3 agreements.  Changes were made to 
California Government Code Section 5956 to 6956.10 authorizing a local to government 
agency to “solicit proposals and enter into agreements with private entities for the 
design, construction, or reconstruction by, and may lease to, private entities for the 
following types of fee-producing infrastructure projects; (a) irrigation; (b) drainage; (c) 
energy or power production; (d) water supply, treatment, and distribution; (e) flood 
control; (f) inland waterways; (g) harbors; (h) municipal improvements; (i) commuter 




purification of water; (n) sewage treatment, disposal, and eater recycling; (o) refuse 
disposal; (p) structures or buildings, except structures or buildings that are to be utilized 
primarily for sporting or entertainment events (California Public Law Stats. 1996 Ch. 
1040).”  Notably, at the time these changes were made, the California Legislature 
intentionally gave broad authorities to local entities. 
Lawmakers appeared sympathetic to the challenges faced by municipalities and 
counties by noting that local government agencies “have experienced a significant 
decrease in available tax revenues to fund necessary infrastructure improvements.” 
Furthermore, this statute noted that if “local government agencies are going to maintain 
the quality of life that this infrastructure provides, they must find new funding sources.  
One source of new money is private investment capital utilized to design, construct, 
maintain, rebuild, improve, repair, or operate, or any combination thereof, fee-producing 
infrastructure facilities, some local governmental agencies will be unable to replace 
deteriorating infrastructure. 
Further, some local governmental agencies will be unable to expand and build 
new infrastructure facilities to serve the population (California Public Law Stats. 1996 
Ch. 1040).”  Recognizing this, the California Legislature further noted that “it is the 
intent of the Legislature that local agencies have the authority and flexibility to utilize 
private investment capital to study, plan, design, construct, develop, finance, maintain, 
rebuild, improve, repair, or operate, or any combination thereof, fee-producing 






Texas lawmakers have made changes to the their P3 enabling legislation over 
time.  Table 15 below summarizes the major P3 enabling legislation provisions in the 
Texas Transportation Code (USDOT FHWA 2018c). 
Texas Transportation Code Chapter 222.001 to 107 outlines many of the ways a 
private sector entity can participate in the delivery of a transportation project in the state.  
For example, Sec. 222.103(a) grants TxDOT the authority to “participate, by spending 
money from any available source, in the cost of the acquisition, construction, 
maintenance, or operation of a toll facility of a public or private entity on terms and 
conditions established by the [Texas Transportation Commission] (Texas Transportation 
Code Statutes 222.001 - 107).” 
Texas Transportation Code Ann. Sec. 366.401(a) further gives powers to regional 
mobility authorities: “[a]n authority may use a comprehensive development agreement 
with a private entity to design, develop, finance, construct, maintain, repair, operate, 





Table 15  Texas P3 Enabling Statutes 
Code Statute Type Projects or Project Types Authorized 
Texas Transportation 





Agreements with private entities for design, 
financing, maintenance, operation, or 
construction—including oversight and inspection—
of a toll or non-toll facility on the state highway 
system, where the private or public entity is paid 
pass-through tolls 
Texas Transportation 
Code Ann. Sec. 91.054; 
Sec. 223.201 to 210; 
Ch. 228; Sec. 371.001 
to 153 
Limited; state Comprehensive development agreements with 
private entities to design, develop, finance, 
construct, maintain, repair, operate, extend or 
expand a toll project or a state highway 
improvement project that either includes both tolled 
and un-tolled lanes, is financed by private activity 
bonds, or in which the private entity has an interest.  
Also allows agreements for financing, design, 
acquisition, construction, maintenance, or operation 
of a project. 
Texas Transportation 
Code Ann. 366.401 to 




Comprehensive development agreements with 
private entities for at least the design, construction, 
rehabilitation, expansion or improvement of a 
turnpike project; also may include financing, 
acquisition, maintenance or operation of a turnpike 
project. 
Texas Transportation 
Code Ann. Sec. 
370.305 to 317; Sec. 
371.001 to 153 
Regional Comprehensive Development Agreements with 
private entities for at least the design and 
construction of a transportation project; also may 
include financing, acquisition, maintenance, or 
operation of a transportation project. Projects may 
not be part of the state highway system unless 
agreed to by the authority and TxDOT  
Texas Transportation 
Code Ann. Ch. 284 
(Subject to Ch. 223 and 





Comprehensive Development Agreements with 
private entities to design, develop, finance, 
construct, maintain, repair, operate, extend, or 
expand a proposed or existing causeway, bridge, 
tunnel, turnpike, highway, or ferry project, to the 
extent and in the manner applicable to TxDOT 
under Ch. 223 and to Regional Tollway Authorities 
under Chapter 366. Projects may not be part of the 
state highway system unless agreed to by TxDOT. 








Case Study Comparison 
As discussed previously, at first glance Texas and California are similar in terms 
of the history and development of P3 enabling legislation, overall population, total 
centerline lane miles, and total vehicle registrations Table 16 below summarizes several 
key characteristics of Texas and California (US Census Bureau 2018, USDOT FHWA 
1983 - 2017, Albalate, Bel i Queralt, and Geddes 2018). 
 
 
Table 16  Comparison of Texas and California 
Characteristic California Texas 
Total Population in 1990 29,760,021 16,986,510 
Total Population in 2016 38,654,206 27,904,862 
Total Housing Units in 2016 13,911,737 9,289,554 
Land Area in Square Miles in 2015 155,779 261,232 
Population Change from 1990 to 2016 29.90% 64.28% 
Total Employment in 2016 30,565,746 20,599,223 
Mean Travel Time to Work in Minutes in 2016 28.4 25.9 
Total Commuters to Work in 2016 17,193,695 12,237,558 
Median Household Income in 2016 $63,783 $54,727 
Total Vehicle Miles Traveled in 2015 335,539,000,000 261,232,000,000 
Total Public Road Lane Miles (2015) 432,083  677,577 
Total Vehicle Registrations in Millions (2015) 29.42 21.86 
P3 Enabling Legislation First Enacted (Year) 1989 1991 
Source: (US Census Bureau 2018, USDOT FHWA 1983 - 2017, Albalate, Bel i Queralt, 
and Geddes 2018) 
 
 
As shown in Table 16, both states are relatively similar in terms of scope (both 
measured in terms of land area and total population), in total vehicle miles traveled, total 
number of registered vehicles, and total number of commuters to work.  These two states 




nearly 65 percent from 1990-2016, whereas California only saw an approximately 30 
percent change during the same period.  In terms of legislative composition, there also 
appears to be important and relevant differences, as shown in Table 17. 
 
 
Table 17  Governor and State Legislature Control by Political Party, 1988-2017 
Year 
California Texas 
Governor Senate Assembly Governor Senate  House 
1988 R D D R D D 
1989 R D D R D D 
1990 R D D R D D 
1991 R D D D D D 
1992 R D D D D D 
1993 R D D D D D 
1994 R D D D D D 
1995 R D S R D D 
1996 R D D R D D 
1997 R D D R R D 
1998 R D D R R D 
1999 D D D R R D 
2000 D D D R R D 
2001 D D D R R D 
2002 D D D R R D 
2003 D D D R R R 
2004 R D D R R R 
2005 R D D R R R 
2006 R D D R R R 
2007 R D D R R R 
2008 R D D R R R 
2009 R D D R R R 
2010 R D D R R R 
2011 D D D R R R 
2012 D D D R R R 
2013 D D D R R R 
2014 D D D R R R 
2015 D D D R R R 
2016 D D D R R R 
2017 D D D R R R 
Note: “D” denotes Democratic controlled, “R” denotes Republican controlled, 
and “S” denotes Split Chamber 





As shown in Table 17, differences in party control of the Governor’s mansion 
and each legislative chamber is noteworthy.  In California, Republicans controlled the 
Governor’s mansion from 1988-1998; Democrats would win the office back in 1998 
with the election of Gray Davis.  Republicans would then win the office back in a 2003 
recall election with Arnold Schwarzenegger and would hold the office until 2010 when 
Mr. Jerry Brown defeated Republican nominee Ms. Margaret Whitman.  Democrats then 
regained control from 2011 onward with Gov. Jerry Brown winning re-election in 2014. 
In Texas, an opposite trend occurred.  In 1986, Bill Clements gained control of 
the Governor’s mansion for Republicans for the first time in decades.  After Mr. 
Clements decided not to run for the 1990 Texas Gubernatorial election, Ms. Ann 
Richards defeated Mr. Clayton W. Williams, Jr. to control the Governor’s mansion once 
again for Democrats. This did not last long: in 1994, George W. Bush defeated Ann 
Richards, and Republicans would retain control as of 2018. 
Party control of the upper and lower chambers would exhibit a similar 
divergence between both states.  Except for 1996, Democrats retained control of the 
California State Senate and Assembly from 1988 to present—an unprecedented 30-year 
run.  In Texas, Republicans would retain control of the upper chamber and lower 
chamber in 1996 and 2003, respectively, where they still hold power as of 2018. 
Differences in political control of the executive and legislative branches for each 
state government is instructive in possibly explaining P3 policy outcomes in each state.  
In addition to political differences, several organizational differences are also evident 




report on transportation governance and finance, compares the key differences in how 
legislatures are organized differently in each state (AASHTO 2016).   
 
 
Table 18  Comparison of California and Texas Legislature Structure 
Characteristic California Legislature Texas Legislature 
Structure Bicameral, Partisan Bicameral, Partisan 
Chambers Senate (40 members), 
Assembly (80 members) 
Senate (41 members), House 
of Representatives (150 
members) 
Type Professional Hybrid 
Session Annual; Approximately 
January to September (odd 
years) and January to 
August (even years) 
Biennial; Approximately 
January to May (odd years 
only) 
Legislative Measures 
Introduced in 2016 
2,600 0 (No 2016 Session) 
Number of Legislative 




Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
In addition to differences in legislative structures, there are also key differences 
in each state’s DOT.  These factors are important because state DOTs play a vital role in 
the planning, design, and delivery of P3 projects.  As shown in Table 19 below, also 
based on data gathered by a 2016 AASHTO report, on the surface these two DOTs 






Table 19  Comparison of Texas and California DOTs 
Characteristic California DOT Texas DOT 
Structure Organized mainly by 
functional activity. 
Organized by both functional activity 
and transportation mode.  TxDOT is 
organized into a number of divisions, 
some of which are dedicated to 
transportation modes (e.g., aviation, 
maritime, public transportation, etc.). 
Leadership Secretary of the California 
State Transportation Agency 
(serves on governor’s cabinet), 
Caltrans Director, California 
Transportation Commission 
(independent body).  The 
California Transportation 
Commission is one of several 
state entities under the 
California State Transportation 
Agency, and is structurally 
separate from Caltrans. 
Executive Director of TxDOT (does 
not serve on governor’s cabinet; 
Texas has no formal cabinet system), 
Texas Transportation Commission 
(independent body). 
Modes Over Which 
the State DOT has 
Jurisdiction 
Roads/bridges, public transit, 
passenger rail, aviation, 
ports/waterways, 
pedestrian/bicycle. 
Roads/bridges, public transit, freight 
and passenger rail, aviation (general 
aviation only), ports/waterways, 
pedestrian/bicycle. TxDOT’s role in 
public transit and general aviation are 
limited to managing grant programs, 
and its role in rail, marine, and non-
motorized transportation is limited to 
statewide coordination and planning. 
TxDOT is the state sponsor of the 
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and, as 
such, facilitates the placement of 
dredge disposal for improvements to 
the waterway by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers. 






Yes. Caltrans owns and 
operates seven toll bridges. 
Yes. TxDOT has jurisdiction over 
some (but not all) toll facilities in the 
state.  Other entities (e.g., RMAs, etc.) 
also have jurisdiction. 





Finally, in terms of total Transportation Infrastructure Financing and Innovation 
Act (TIFIA) activity, there does appear to be noticeable differences between the two 
states.  As shown in Table 20, California received a total of $1.8 billion in TIFIA 



















FY2012 $852,000,000  $150,000,000  
SR 91 Corridor 
Improvement 
User Charges FY2013 $1,279,000,000  $421,000,000  
Gerald Desmond 
Bridge Replacement 
Port Revenues FY2014 $1,288,000,000  $325,000,000  
I-405 Improvement 
Project 
Toll Revenues FY2017 $1,908,100,000  $628,930,000  
I-15 Express Lanes 
Project 
Toll Revenues FY2017 $461,300,000  $152,200,000  
Total $6,446,400,000  $1,817,130,000  
Source: (USDOT 2018a) 
 
 
As shown in Table 21, Texas received a total of $5.6 billion in TIFIA assistance 

























FY2005 $304,700,000  $66,000,000  




FY2007 $1,328,000,000  $430,000,000  
IH 635 Managed Lanes 
User 
Charges 
FY2010 $2,615,000,000  $850,000,000  
North Tarrant Express 
Segments 1 and 2A 
User 
Charges 
FY2010 $2,047,000,000  $650,000,000  





FY2011 $1,268,000,000  $418,000,000  
North Tarrant Express 
(Segments 3A and 3B) 
User 
Charges 
FY2013 $1,637,000,000  $531,000,000  




FY2014 $2,913,000,000  $841,000,000  
State Highway (SH) 288 
Toll Lanes Project 
Toll 
Revenues 









FY2017 $1,303,000,000  $285,000,000  
Total $18,588,800,000  $5,610,200,000  
Source: (USDOT 2018a) 
 
 
Finally, Table 22 compares the total number of projects that were proposed and 





Table 22  Comparison of P3 Activity, Texas and California   
Characteristic California Texas 
Number of Projects Proposed 15 9 
Number of Projects Completed 9 33 
Total Number of P3 Projects, Proposed and Completed 24 42 
Average Project Cost, Projects Proposed $3,033,000,000 $1,276,000,000 
Average Project Cost, Projects Completed $675,000,000 $680,000,000 
Source: (Reinhardt 2018) 
 
 
As shown in Table 22, California had a total of 24 P3 or design-build projects 
that were proposed since its enabling legislation was enacted into law in 1989—nine of 
which were completed (39 percent).  By comparison, Texas had a total of 42 design-
build or P3 projects that were proposed, with 33 (79 percent) that were completed.  Of 
the projects that were proposed that data were available, the average project cost seen in 
California (i.e., $3 billion) was much greater than the average project cost seen in Texas 
(i.e., $1.2 billion.)  The average cost of projects completed in California and Texas were 
$0.675 billion and $0.680 billion, respectively.  
 
Theory, Data, and Methods 
The qualitative analysis tests the remaining two hypotheses: H2 and H3.  H2, 
shown in Figure 7, addresses a second often cited reason for pursuing P3 enabling 
legislation: project innovation (Grimsey and Lewis 2007).  Some studies have shown 
that when a private sector entity has greater control over the financing and design 
components of project delivery, the private sector may be incentivized to innovate 




is the following: H2 = a state with P3 enabling legislation saw projects that offered and 




Figure 7  H2 Project Innovation 
 
 
H3, as shown in Figure 8, addresses a commonly cited reason for pursuing P3 
enabling legislation: highway P3 enabling legislation incentivizes additional private 
sector investment capital in that state, or leverage potential.  Previous studies have found 
some evidence linking the presence of public-private partnership enabling legislation 
and more private capital flow to help finance the construction of a public infrastructure 
asset (Rall, Reed, and Farber 2010).  If it is shown that P3 enabling legislation does lead 
to overall improved investment potential by the public sector, this would help provide 
evidence of a relationship between P3 enabling legislation and a positive, lasting public 
benefit (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011).  Operationalized, then, the third sub-
hypothesis is as follows: H3 = States with P3 enabling legislation permitted states to 





Figure 8  H3 Leveraged Potential 
 
 
To test H2 and H3, 20 one-on-one telephone interviews were scheduled with 
public and private sector officials with knowledge of the P3 delivery process, nine were 
from California and 11 from Texas.  I followed IRB protocol and asked interviewees 
questions only provided in Appendix 2.  However, at times interviewees did provide 
additional information that was not the subject of this research.  These interviews were 
scheduled for no more than 20 minutes; however, most interviews went longer.  The 
range in telephone interviews also varied: the shortest telephone interview lasted 17.1 
minutes.  The longest conversation was 39.1 minutes.  The average telephone call was 
25.9 minutes.  Per IRB protocol, the telephone calls were not recorded.  All interviewees 
were informed about the purpose of this research and were given instructions to notify 
me if they wished to end the telephone conversation at any time; however, no 
interviewee asked to stop the telephone conversation early. 
Of those familiar with the P3 experience in California, four were currently or 
formerly employed by a public sector agency, two were currently or formerly employed 
at a law firm that participated in representing a public or private firm involved in a P3 




familiar with the P3 experience in Texas, five were currently or formerly employed by a 
public sector agency, three were currently or formerly employed at a law firm that 
participated in representing a public or private firm involved in a P3 project, and three 
were currently or formerly employed at a consulting firm.  Table 23 summarizes the 
state, institution, and telephone interview duration for each interviewee. 
 
 




State  Organization Type Sector Interview 
Duration 
(Minutes) 
1 California Public Sector Agency Public 22.5 
2 California Public Sector Agency Public 39.1 
3 California Public Sector Agency Public 18.1 
4 California Public Sector Agency Private 25.6 
5 California Legal Counsel Private 41.9 
6 California Legal Counsel Private 22.6 
7 California Consulting Firm Private 19.3 
8 California Consulting Firm Private 18.5 
9 California Consulting Firm Private 33.1 
10 Texas Public Sector Agency Public 26.3 
11 Texas Public Sector Agency Public 21.2 
12 Texas Public Sector Agency Public 24.5 
13 Texas Public Sector Agency Public 33.1 
14 Texas Public Sector Agency Public 32.0 
15 Texas Legal Counsel Private 17.1 
16 Texas Legal Counsel Private 36.1 
17 Texas Legal Counsel Private 20.0 
18 Texas Consulting Firm Private 19.3 
19 Texas Consulting Firm Private 25.1 








Once the interviews were complete, I then coded, cleaned, organized, and 
synthesized the results.  I stored my data on a password protected, encrypted drive to 
ensure the confidentiality of the interviewee is protected.  Once I completed my analysis, 
I destroyed personally identifiable information. 
 
Results 
With regard to H2, project innovation, interviewees were asked the following: 
“Based on your knowledge of P3 projects delivered in your state, have they led to 
innovations that benefitted the public?”  Interviewees were asked to report either “yes” 
or “no.”  As a follow-up question, interviewees were then asked to respond on a scale 
from 1 to 5 to the following statement: “P3 projects have led to improved project 
innovation in my state, with “1” as “Strongly Disagree” to “5” as “Strongly Agree.”  





Table 24  Project Innovation Responses and Ranked Score 
Interviewee 
No. 
State Yes or No Response Ranked 
Response 
1 Texas Yes 5 
2 Texas No 4 
3 Texas Yes 3 
4 Texas Yes 3 
5 Texas Yes 4 
6 Texas No 2 
7 Texas Yes 5 
8 Texas Yes 4 
9 Texas Yes 3 
10 Texas Yes 3 
11 Texas No 3 
12 California Yes 4 
13 California Yes 3 
14 California No 2 
15 California No 2 
16 California Yes 3 
17 California Yes 3 
18 California No 2 
19 California No 2 
20 California Yes 3 
Texas Average 3.6 
California Average 2.7 
Total Average 3.2 
Note: For confidentiality reasons, the interviewee number in this table does 
not correspond interviewee number descriptions presented in Table 23  
 
 
As discussed in Table 24, a majority of interviewees from Texas (8 out of 10) 
and California (4 out of 9) reported project innovations that resulted from having P3 
enabling legislation in place.  The average response rank on project innovation for Texas 
and California was 3.6 and 2.7, respectively. 
With respect to H3, leverage potential, interviewees were asked, “Based on your 




investment from the private sector?”  Interviewees were then asked to report either “yes” 
or “no”.  As a follow-up question, interviewees were also asked to respond on a scale 
from 1 to 5 to the following statement: “P3 projects have led to increased leveraged 
investment in my state, with “1” as “Strongly Disagree” to “5” as “Strongly Agree.”   
Table 25 below summarizes the responses from these questions. 
 
 
Table 25  Leveraged Investment Responses and Ranked Score 
Interviewee 
No. 
State Yes or No Response Ranked Response 
1 Texas Yes 4 
2 Texas Yes 4 
3 Texas Yes 5 
4 Texas Yes 4 
5 Texas Yes 5 
6 Texas Yes 5 
7 Texas Yes 5 
8 Texas Yes 4 
9 Texas No 1 
10 Texas Yes 5 
11 Texas Yes 5 
12 California No 1 
13 California No 2 
14 California Yes 4 
15 California Yes 5 
16 California Yes 5 
17 California Yes 5 
18 California Yes 5 
19 California Yes 4 
20 California Yes 5 
Texas Average 4.3 
California Average 4.0 
Total Average 4.2 
Note: For confidentiality reasons, the interviewee number in this table 
does not correspond interviewee number descriptions presented in 






As shown in Table 25 above, similar to what was observed with leverage 
potential, a majority of interviewees from Texas (9 out of 11) and California (7 out of 9) 
reported that they could report leverage potential that resulted from P3 projects.  The 




The qualitative portion of this dissertation compared the P3 experience in Texas 
and California.  As discussed previously, these two states were chosen for comparison 
for both their similarities and differences.  The way these two states are similar—both 
large, growing, diverse, and relatively auto-dependent urban areas which enacted their 
transportation P3 enabling legislation roughly around the same time—is especially 
noteworthy in light in the differences in P3 project experience.  One noteworthy statistic: 
Texas has been nearly six times more productive in using this delivery method (as 
measured by total project cost delivered via P3) than California.  
A total of 20 subject matter experts in the area of P3s were interviewed for this 
dissertation research—including six with direct knowledge in Texas and four with direct 
knowledge in California.  Based on the feedback from these responses, several themes 
emerged.  First, there appeared to be an attitudinal difference on the overall effectiveness 
of P3 projects themselves.  Many of the officials from Texas noted that while P3 
enabling legislation underwent several changes, the overall framework gave the state 




however, challenges with a few projects early on quickly soured the public’s mood on 
the delivery method.  One interviewee from California noted that after the first few 
projects were not perceived as successful, “from that point forward, P3 highway projects 
were never able to truly get off the ground (Texas and California P3 Subject Matter 
Expert Interviews 2018).” 
This is not to suggest, however, that officials in either state were pessimistic 
about the long-term prospects of P3 delivery method.  Interviewees in both states were 
hopeful about the future prospect of P3s as a delivery method and wanted to see it 
continue as an option for the future.  “Given the realities of transportation funding, it 
would be crazy not to have [P3s] as a tool in our state’s toolbox,” one interviewee noted 
(Texas and California P3 Subject Matter Expert Interviews 2018). 
Several interviewees from California noted an interesting observation: while P3s 
may not be a heavily used tool at the state level, its statute gives local governments the 
power to consider P3s.  Texas’s statute also gives regional authorities some flexibility to 
consider alternative delivery approaches as well, although California’s statute grants 
these powers directly to regional and local governments.  Despite this feature in 
California’s, however, a few public sector interviewees said that they were surprised this 
power wasn’t utilized more by local governments.  This is one area of opportunity for 
future research. 
There appeared to be some inconsistencies among interviewees regarding the 
short and medium-term prospects for P3s.  Exactly half of the respondents—an equal 




tool to consider, they see the continued use of the design-build delivery method for many 
of their larger projects.  Others, however, noted that transportation funding is simply 
becoming too challenging and the prospect of transferring project risk, especially 
financing risk, to the private sector from a DOT perspective is simply too attractive of a 
feature to ignore.  Finally, regarding overall benefits to the public: interviewees were in 
nearly unanimous agreement that the evidence so far they have seen suggests that P3 
projects were a net positive for their state.  However, nearly all also said that public 
messaging remained a challenge.  Several interviewees noted that a better job could be 
done to quantify the benefits of P3 projects and discuss those benefits to their respective 
state’s population.   
Due to the small number of states included in this analysis, there are limitations 
associated with definitively rejecting the null hypothesis for H2 and H3 to provide 
support that P3 projects result in increased project innovation and greater leveraged 
investment.  As the outcomes associated with the P3 project delivery method become 








As discussed, declining federal, state, and local transportation resources available 
for transportation through more traditional sources have led to increased pressure for 
state legislatures and DOTs to explore other options to fund, finance, and deliver 
highway transportation infrastructure projects (Hodge and Greve 2007).  One result of 
this increased pressure is a growing number of state legislatures considering (and in 
some cases, enacting) bills authorizing their state departments of transportation to enter 
into P3 agreements.  This trend—which mostly started in the early 2000s and is 
continuing up through 2018—shows no sign of slowing down (see Figure 5).  It is for 
this reason that P3s in general (and P3 enabling statutory framework in particular) is a 
continued area of importance for academics and practitioners in the transportation and 
urban planning fields.   
In light of this, the key research question this dissertation sought to examine is 
whether the outcomes seen in a state after P3 enabling legislation was passed provided 
clear benefits to the public.  This dissertation utilized a mixed-methods approach: one 
that relied on a quantitative assessment of all 50 states and a deep-dive in two states 
relevant to this discussion.  Findings from both the quantitative and qualitative parts of 
this dissertation provide findings dependent upon their design, but both provide a useful 




Summary of Findings 
The review of literature this study provides relevant findings.  First, the way that 
P3 enabling legislation has been adopted over time can be explained by all four 
competing theories behind federalism at work simultaneously (Kenneth 1946).  For 
example, the way P3 enabling legislation has diffused across different states rather than 
through one single federal law shows ideationist theories of federalism at work (Karch 
2007).  Simultaneously, a direct legacy of the colonial structure in the pre-federalist 
American federal system is reflected in the 50 state DOTs overseen by 50 different state 
legislatures (Haider-Markel 2014). This is explained best through the “infrastructural 
powers” theory that notes “federalism is likely to emerge when the subunits of a 
potential federation already have highly developed infrastructures.”  A further 
manifestation of this legacy, then, are the 50 different beliefs on P3 policy reflected in 
each state (Karch 2007). 
A second key finding is the importance of agenda setting—especially within the 
context of whether a state eventually adopts P3 enabling legislation.  A cursory review 
of this legislation suggests the time that legislation is first proposed in a state legislature 
to the time it is eventually enacted into law is short.  While this does not confirm the 
theory that putting the issue of P3s on the agenda is the most difficult part of the process, 
a review of P3 enabling legislation by state does suggest that state legislatures appear 
fairly efficient at moving the issue through their respective chambers.  This is especially 
noteworthy for P3 enabling legislation due to the extensive complexity of the policy 




their P3 enabling legislation years after the initial enabling legislation is passed, rarely 
do state legislatures decide to go in a fundamentally different direction. 
The six policy diffusion theories presented in this literature review are also 
instructive for explaining how P3 enabling legislation spread from just a handful of 
states in the early 2000s to over three-dozen in 2018 (Albalate, Bel i Queralt, and 
Geddes 2018).  Based on a cursory timeline of when states adopted their P3 enabling 
legislation, some theories (e.g., problem severity, state wealth, ideology) appear far more 
relevant in explaining this spread than others (e.g., legislative professionalism, 
neighboring state, national intervention.) 
Finally, this literature review took a deep dive into the history of P3 legislation 
itself.  While this discussion focused on the institutional actors involved in the 
development of Texas P3 enabling legislation, it is reasonable to suggest that similar 
actors also participated in the development of P3 enabling legislation in similar ways in 
other states.  Relatedly, this review also aimed to provide a surface-level review on the 
relevant “pros” and “cons” of the P3 delivery method itself (Farley and Norboge 2014).  
While there are certainly opportunities for additional research in the area of overall P3 
project cost and time savings, the research summarized here seeks to provide the 
necessary context in this area. 
Results from the quantitative and qualitative portions of this dissertation provide 
mostly mixed evidence on whether states with P3 enabling legislation provide increased 
public benefit.  The quantitative portion of this study tests the impact of debt and risk 




for highway projects in states before and after enacting P3 enabling legislation.   These 
results suggest a statistically significant increase in debt obligations after enacting P3 
enabling legislation (p < .001).  However, qualitative results support H2 and H3: a clear 
majority of interviewees from both Texas and California report that P3 enabling 
legislation has benefitted the public by increasing project innovation (H2) and allowing 
additional leverage potential (H3).  Overall, interviewees from Texas and California 
viewed P3s as one policy “tool” among a wider set of alternative delivery approaches 
supporting successful planning and project delivery. 
 
Study Implications 
Results from the qualitative assessment imply the positive potential of P3 
projects.  It was evident in conversations with interviewees that the political environment 
and culture in Texas is more supportive of P3 projects than California.  However, despite 
this difference in culture, both groups of interviewees voiced support of P3’s and their 
ability to provide public benefit.  This stands in contrast to the results from the 
quantitative analysis—clear evidence of the public benefit of P3 enabling legislation was 
not supported empirically.  Specific to debt and risk transfer (H1), this is partially due to 
an inability to measure outside factors that could place added strain on debt obligations.  
Furthermore, P3 projects represent an extremely low percent of total projects delivered, 
indicating any reduction in overall average debt obligations would be equally low.  In 




increasing need to rely on P3 enabling legislation.  This is suggested in the results from 
the qualitative analysis as well as previous literature (Buxbaum and Ortiz 2009).  
When reviewing these implications, two major limitations are inherent in this 
study.  First, is the relatively small number of state examples contained within the 
quantitative analysis and the even fewer number of case study states in the qualitative 
research.  A second limitation is specific to the qualitative portion of this dissertation.  
Finally, while every effort was made to ensure data collected were accurate and fact-
based as possible, it is impossible to ensure such interviews were free from bias. 
 
Future Areas of Study 
Further research on the topic of P3s in general (and P3 enabling legislation in 
particular) is sorely needed.  The limitations in this study demonstrate there is a need for 
developing new validated quantitative measures that assess the before and after effects 
of P3 enabling legislation.  Specifically, these measures may be able to help shed further 
light on the features of P3 enabling legislation that lead to better overall public benefit.  
A first attempt toward developing an overall evaluative framework was outlined in this 
dissertation but it is in no way perfect.  Future work could further test and validate useful 
measures that assess, as objectively as possible, the benefits of this legislation.  
Second, there is a significant need for a comprehensive, publicly-available data 
set of inputs and outcomes associated with transportation infrastructure projects—both 
delivered via the conventional design-bid-build method and via alternative delivery 




FHWA released a discussion paper that “explores the issues associated with compiling 
information on major surface transportation projects in a publicly accessible online 
information source or database to assist in establishing benchmarks on projects delivered 
conventionally and through Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) (USDOT FHWA 2017).”  
Future work in this direction could continue to improve and ensure that P3 project 
outcomes are providing clear benefits to the public. 
Measuring outcomes resulting from P3 enabling legislation is an inherently 
difficult proposition that can be fraught with risks and uncertainty.  In light of this, 
several possible new measures could be devised that better measure outcomes resulting 
from P3 projects.  For example, one possible idea is a single P3 index measuring public 
benefit by P3 project or set of projects as a whole.  Variables tested within this 
dissertation, as well as other variables, could be included into an index that quantifies the 
value a project provides the public if it were to be delivered via a delivery method 
beyond the traditional design-bid-build method.  Such a comprehensive measure could 
help policymakers determine outcomes based on the specific design of their respective 
state’s P3 enabling legislation.  Further information on P3 enabling statute by all 37 
states that have P3 enabling legislation as of 2018 can be found in Appendix 3 of this 
dissertation. 
To develop such a comprehensive index measure, however, high-quality data is 
sorely needed.  This is one opportunity where state legislators could mandate state DOTs 




effectiveness of their P3 projects.  Such requirements could help to better ensure that P3 
policy is meeting the goals as originally intended. 
While further work may be needed toward better measurement of P3 project 
outcomes, the current state of P3’s has not gone unnoticed by the transportation 
community.  For example, there is an ongoing project funded by the FHWA’s Center for 
Innovative Finance Support, expected to be completed in 2019, that aims to build a 
comprehensive database of measures for major projects around the U.S., including P3 
projects (USDOT FHWA 2018a).  Furthermore, a recent report entitled Successful 
Practices for P3s, published by FHWA and based on feedback from a diverse working 
group of public and private sector officials, offered several recommendations for 
effective performance monitoring and oversight.  Among other recommendations, this 
report called for “defining output-based metrics” that “facilitate innovative solutions 
better than input-based or detailed performance specifications (USDOT FHWA 2016).”  
In doing so, this report recommended key performance indicators “tailored” to “project-
specific circumstances and reflect agency and community objectives (USDOT FHWA 
2016).”  These efforts suggest that both FHWA and state DOTs are moving in the 
direction toward monitoring and improving P3 project outcomes. 
Furthermore, P3s have been used widely elsewhere outside the U.S.—often with 
success. Future research on international models for measuring P3 outcomes could be 
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This appendix provides the complete results from the statistical two-sample t-test 
results and box plot comparisons by FHWA P3 category.  The t-tests and box plots are 
presented in the following order: 
 Percent Population Change from 2010-2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation; 
 Total State Population in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation; 
 Total State Lane Miles in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation; 
 Number of State Transportation Entities in 2017; 
 Number of State Transportation Legislative Committees with Jurisdiction over 
Transportation in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation; 
 Authorized State DOT Expenditures in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation; 
 Total State Transportation Revenues in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation; 
 Authorized State Debt Obligations in 2017; and 





Table 26  Percent Population Change from 2010-2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation T-
Test Results 
Source: (US Census Bureau 2018) 
 
  
Figure 9  Percent Population Change from 2010-2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation 
Category Box Plot 
Source: (US Census Bureau 2018, USDOT FHWA 2018c) 
P3 
Enabling 









No 13 .0431418 .0095398     .0343962    .0223564    .0639273 
Yes 37 .0473741 .0064731      .0393740     .0342461      .0605020 
Combined 50 .0462737 .0053521         .0378452     .0355182 .0570292 








Table 27  Total State Population in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation T-Test Results 
P3 
Enabling 









No 13 3,641,360      1,511,019      5,448,057     349,131      6,933,588 
Yes 37 7,505,068      1,268,678      7,717,064      4,932,071     10,100,000 
Combined 50 6,500,504      1,038,778      7,345,270      4,413,002      8,588,007 





Source: (US Census Bureau 2018) 
 
  
Figure 10  Total State Population in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation Category Box Plot 





Table 28  Total State Lane Miles in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation T-Test Results 
P3 
Enabling 









No 13 155307      24767.3     89299.76     101343.7     209270.3 
Yes 37 181067.4     21297.56       129548       137874     224260.9 
Combined 50 174369.7     16978.42     120055.6     140250.3     208489.1 




P-value 0.5113   
Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
Figure 11  Total State Lane Miles in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation Category Box 
Plot 


















No 13 1.461538     .6851482     2.470337    -.0312712     2.954348 
Yes 37 2.135135     .3425793     2.083829     1.440352     2.829918 
Combined 50 1.96     .3089944      2.18492     1.339052     2.580948 





Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
Figure 12  Number of State Transportation Entities in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation 
Category Box Plot 




Table 30  Number of State Legislative Committees with Jurisdiction Over 
Transportation in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation T-Test Results 
P3 
Enabling 









No 13 3.307692     0.3468654     1.250641     2.551938     4.063447 
Yes 37 4.378378      0.382326     2.325599     3.602985     5.153772 
Combined 50 4.100000     0.3027089     2.140475     3.491684     4.708316 





Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
  
Figure 13  Number of State Legislative Committees with Jurisdiction over 
Transportation in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation Category Box Plot 

















No 13 1.97e+09     7.95e+08     2.87e+09     2.40e+08     3.70e+09 
Yes 37 3.76e+09     6.15e+08     3.64e+09     2.51e+09     5.01e+09 
Combined 50 3.28e+09         5.07e+08     3.51e+09 2.26e+09     4.30e+09 




P-value 0.1176   
Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
Figure 14  Authorized Transportation Expenditures by P3 Enabling Legislation 
Category Box Plot 

















No 13 1.94e+09     8.64e+08     2.99e+09     4.28e+07     3.85e+09 
Yes 37 3.43e+09     5.23e+08     2.96e+09     2.37e+09     4.50e+09 
Combined 50 3.03e+09     4.54e+08     3.01e+09     2.11e+09     3.94e+09 





Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
Figure 15  Total State Revenue for Transportation in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation 
Category Box Plot 




Table 33  Authorized State Debt Obligations Outstanding in 2017 by P3 Enabling 
Legislation T-Test Results 
P3 
Enabling 









No 13 8.17e+08     5.61e+08     2.02e+09     
   -
4.06e+08 2.04e+09 
Yes 37 1.47e+09     4.91e+08     2.99e+09     4.74e+08     2.47e+09 
Combined 50 1.30e+09     3.91e+08     2.77e+09     5.15e+08     2.09e+09 





Source: (AASHTO 2016) 
 
 
Figure 16  Authorized State Debt Obligations Outstanding in 2017 by P3 Enabling 
Legislation Category Box Plot  

















No 13 5.12e+10     1.64e+10     5.90e+10     1.55e+10     8.68e+10 
Yes 37 1.20e+11     1.84e+10     1.12e+11     8.25e+10     1.57e+11 
Combined 50 1.02e+11     1.48e+10     1.05e+11     7.22e+10     1.32e+11 
Difference  -6.88e+10     3.27e+10                 -1.35e+11    -2.97e+09 
t value -2.1014                
 
DF 48 
P-value 0.0409   
Source: (USDOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2018) 
 
 
Figure 17  Annual Vehicle Kilometers Traveled in 2017 by P3 Enabling Legislation 
Category Box Plot 








1. What has been the history of highway public-private partnership (P3) enabling 
legislation in your state? 
2. Who were the primary contractors and other professional services firms that 
participated in some of the early P3 projects in your state? 
3. What were some of the factors reported to you by private firms about ways your 
state’s public private partnership enabling legislation helped or hindered the 
chance of the project reaching close? 
4. Based on your knowledge of P3 projects delivered in your state, have they led to 
innovations that benefitted the public? 
5. Did the contractors you worked with have experience with P3 projects 
elsewhere? 
6. Were any projects that you participated in financed using Transportation 
Infrastructure Financing and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loans? 
7. In total, how many deals were closed under your state’s P3 enabling legislation? 
8. How many of these deals were for roadway improvements? Transit 
improvements? 
9. Based on your knowledge of P3 projects delivered in your state, have they led to 
increased leveraged investment from the private sector? 
10. Do you have additional documents regarding the development of your state’s 
public-private partnership enabling legislation that you would be willing to share 
for this project? 
11. Who were your primary contacts at FHWA? 
12. Do you have data on key projects that closed in your state that you would be 
willing to share for this project? 
13. Do you have other information relevant to this topic that you would be willing to 




APPENDIX 3  
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP STATUTE BY STATE 
 
 
Table 35  Summary of Key P3 Statutes by State (1 of 3) 
State P3 Statute(s) Page # 
Alabama  Ala. Code §§ 23-1-40 
 Ala. Code §§ 23-1-81  
127 
Alaska  Alaska Stat. §§ 19.75.011 to 990;  128 
Arizona  Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-7701 to 7710 A 129 
Arkansas  Ark. Stat. Ann. § 14-305-102;  130 
California  Cal. Gov. Code §§ 5956 to 5956.10 131 
Colorado  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 32-9-128.5 
 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1-1201 to 1209 
 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 43-2-219 
 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-3-202.5 
 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-4-413-414 
 Colo. Rev. Stat §§ 43-4-801 to 812 
132 
Connecticut  Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 4-255 to 4-263 133 
Delaware  Del. Cod. Ann. Tit. 2, §§ 2001 to 2012 134 
Florida  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 334.30 
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 337.251 
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 338.22 to 2511 
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 343.962 
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 343.87 
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 348.0004 
 Fla. Stat. Ann § 287.05712 
 Fla. Stat. Ann § 255.065 
135 
Georgia  Ga. Code Ann. §48-5-41 
 Ga. Code Ann. §48- 5-421.1 
 Ga. Code Ann. § 32-10-76 
 Ga. Code Ann. §32-2-41(b)(6) 
 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 32-2-78 to 80 
 Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 36-91-110 to 36-91-118 
137 







Table 36  Summary of Key P3 Statutes by State (2 of 3) 
State P3 Statute(s) Page # 
Illinois  Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 20, § 2705/2705-450 
 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 620 § 75/2-35 
 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 605, § 5/10-802 
 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 605 §§ 130/1 to 130/999 
 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 630 §§ 15/5 
138 
Indiana  Ind. Code Ann. §§ 5-23-1-1 to 5-23-7-2 
 Ind. Code Ann. §§ 8-15.5-1-1 to 8-15.5-13-8 
 Ind. Code Ann. §§ 8-15.7-1-1 to 8-15.7-16-8 
140 
Kentucky  Ky. Rev. Stat. § 45A.077 141 
Louisiana  La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48:250 
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48:1660.1 
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§48:2020 to 2037 
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§48:2071 to 2074; La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §48:2077 
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§48:2084 to 2084.15  
142 
Maine  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title 23, § 4251 143 
Maryland  Md. Code Regs. § 23.3.05.05 
 Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. §§ 10a-101 to 10a-403 
 Md. Code Regs. §§ 11.07.06.01 to 14 
144 
Massachusetts  Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 6C, §§1 to 74 145 
Michigan  Mich. Comp. Laws § 124.401 to 426 
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 125.1871 to 125.1883 
146 
Minnesota  Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 160.84 to 98 147 
Mississippi  Miss. Code Ann. §§ 65-43-1 to 85 148 
Missouri  Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 227.600 to 669 
 Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 238.300 to 367 
149 
New Jersey  NJ - Statute to be determined; SB 865 150 
Nevada  Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 338.161 to 167 
 Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 338.161 to 168 
 Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 277A 
151 
New Hampshire  NH Rev. Stat. Ann. 228:107 to 228:115 152 
North Carolina  NC Gen. Stat. § 136-18 
 NC Gen. Stat. §§ 136-89.180 to 198 
153 
Ohio  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5501.71 to 5501.75 154 
Oklahoma  Okla. Code Ann. Tit. 74 § 5151 to 5158 155 
Oregon  Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 383.001 to 075 
 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 367.800 to 826 
 Or. Rev. Stat. § 184.631 
156 






Table 37  Summary of Key P3 Statutes by State (3 of 3) 
State P3 Statute(s) Page # 
Pennsylvania  Penn. Conso. Stat.74 §§ 9101 to 9124 157 
South Carolina  SC Code Ann. §§57-5-1310 to 1495 
 SC Code § 57-3-200 
 SC Code Ann. §§57-5-1310 to 1495 
158 
Tennessee  Tenn. Code §§ 54-3-101 to 54-3-113 
 Tenn. Code §§ 54-6-101 to 54-6-121 
 Tenn. Code §§ 54-3-101 to 54-3-113 
159 
Texas  Tex. Transportation Code Ann. §§222.001 to 107 
 Tex. Transportation Code Ann. §§ 366.401 to 409 
 Tex. Transportation Code Ann. §§222.001 to 107 
160 
Utah  Utah Code Ann. § 63G-6-503; § 63G6a-103; § 6 3G-
6a702; § 63G6a-703; § 63G-6a-707 
 Utah Code Ann. §72-6-118; Utah Code Ann. 72-2-120 
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-6-503; § 63G6a-103; § 6 3G-
6a702; § 63G6a-703; § 63G-6a-707 
161 
Virginia  Va. Code §§ 33.2-1800Wash. Rev. Code §§ 47.29.010 to 
900 
162 
Washington  Wash. Rev. Code §§ 47.29.010 to 900 163 
West Virginia  W.Va. Code §§ 17-28-1 to 12 164 
Wisconsin  Wis. Stat. Ann. § 84.01 (30) 165 








Table 38  Alabama P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Ala. Code §§ 23-
1-40 
Effective November 2018, this statute describes the state DOT duties 
and powers generally. The statute gives the DOT the authority to enter 
into contracts with public or private entities for the construction of a 
public road, bridge, or tunnel. The DOT may use design-build, design-
build-operate, design-build-own-operate, design-build-own-operate-
maintain, design-build-finance-operate-maintain, or other similar project 
delivery models in which "the design, right-of-way acquisition, 
relocation of structures or utilities, construction, financing, ownership, 
management, maintenance, and operation, or any combination thereof, of 
a public road, bridge, or tunnel project is accomplished by the 
department or on behalf of the department by any of the aforementioned 
entities or methods." The DOT may also enter leases, licenses, 
franchises, concessions, or other agreements for the development, 
operation, management, or undertaking of all or any part of a public 
road, bridge, or tunnel project. 
Ala. Code §§ 23-
1-81 
Authorizes county commissions and the state DOT to license private 
entities to establish or operate toll roads, toll bridges, ferries or 
causeways. Allows the authorization of a licensee to establish and fix the 
rates of toll. 
Ala. Code §§ 23-
2-140 to 163 
Authorizes the Alabama Toll Road, Bridge and Tunnel Authority to 
enter into agreements for design-build, design-build-operate, design-
build-own-operate or design-build-own-operate-maintain contracts, or 
other similar arrangements or agreements; also allows for leases, 
licenses, franchises, concessions or other agreements for the 
development, operation, management or undertaking of all or any part of 
a project. Allows any entity that owns, leases or otherwise operates a toll 
facility to set and collect tolls, subject to such conditions as the authority 
and the state DOT may establish. Allows bids to be awarded by best 
value or qualifications. Sets the bond issue date at 75 years. 








Table 39  Alaska P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Alaska Stat. §§ 
19.75.011 to 990 
Authorizes the Knik Arm Bridge and Toll Authority to enter into P3s in 
any form to finance, design, construct, maintain, improve or operate the 
Knik Arm Bridge. Allows the authority to issue bonds or incur other 
forms of indebtedness to finance the project and to fix and collect tolls 
for the use of the bridge; these tolls may exceed operating costs. 








Table 40  Arizona P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 
28-7701 to 7710 A 
Comprehensive statute that authorizes P3s for transportation projects. 
Under legislation enacted in 2009 (Senate Bill 2396; 2009 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws, Chap. 141), authorizes the state DOT to enter into agreements 
with private entities to design, build, finance, maintain, operate, manage 
and/or lease transportation facilities, or for any other project delivery 
method that the DOT determines will serve the public interest. Allows 
for availability payments and revenue sharing. Limits agreements to no 
more than 50 years, which may be extended by the DOT. Requires any 
foreign entity that submits a concession agreement to provide 
satisfactory evidence of compliance with certain requirements. Prohibits 
noncompete clauses, in that a P3 agreement must include a provision that 
bars a private partner from seeking relief to hinder the DOT from 
developing or constructing any facility that was planned at the time the 
agreement was executed. However, an agreement may provide for 
reasonable compensation to the private partner for adverse effects on 
revenues resulting from the development and construction of a then-
unplanned facility. Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 








Table 41  Arkansas P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 
14-305-102 
The law authorizes the use by counties of P3s for the development of 
unpaved roads. 
Ark. Stat. Ann. 
§§27-86-201 to 
211; Ark. Stat. 
Ann. §27.76.402 
Sections 27-86-201 to 211 allows counties to grant franchises to private 
entities to build toll bridges, turnpikes or causeways over or along 
swamps, watercourses, lakes or bays whenever it is in the public interest. 
Requires consent from the federal government for construction of the 
bridge. Gives counties superintending authority on rates. Prohibit 
granting a franchise to operate a toll road on the state highway system. 
Section 27.76.402 prohibits a regional mobility authority from selling a 
toll facility project to a private entity or entering into a lease or 
concession agreement for a toll facility. 
Ark. Code §§ 22-
10-101 to 22-10-
505 
The Partnership for Public Facilities and Infrastructure Act authorizes 
county and local government to use P3 for projects that have a long-term 
operations agreement. Eligible projects include: ferry, mass transit 
facility, vehicle parking facility, port facility, power generation facility, 
fuel supply facility, combined heating and power facility, central utility 
plant facility, distributed generation facility, oil or gas pipeline, water 
supply facility, water treatment intake and distribution facility, waste 
water treatment and collection facility, waste treatment facility, hospital, 
library, school, educational facility, medical or nursing care facility, 
recreational facility, administrative facility, law enforcement facility, fire 
department facility, public administrative office, toll road, correctional 
facility, technology infrastructure facility, public building, and 
transportation system. Projects must be approved by the Arkansas 
Economic Development Commission and Arkansas Development 
Finance Authority. The statue does not apply to the DOT. 








Table 42  California P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Cal. Gov. Code §§ 
5956 to 5956.10 
Authorizes local governmental agencies to enter into agreements with 
private entities to study, plan, design, construct, develop, finance, 
maintain, rebuild, improve, repair and/or operate a variety of fee-
producing infrastructure facilities, including rail, highway, bridge, tunnel 
or airport projects. Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 
Prohibits using the authority in this section to design, construct, finance 
or operate a toll road on a state highway. 








Table 43  Colorado P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 
32-9-128.5 
Regional Transportation District has authority for mass transit projects. 
This statute describes how the Regional Transportation District may load 
net proceeds of private activity or exempt facility bonds to a private 
entity to finance all or a portion of a project.  
Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 43-1-1201 to 
1209 
Allows the state DOT to enter into agreements for public-private 
initiatives, including for the design, financing, construction, operation, 
maintenance, and/or improvement of toll roads, turnpikes and high-
occupancy toll lanes. Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 
43-2-219 
Authorizes a board of county commissioners to enter into public-private 
initiatives for county highways and bridges, to privatize any county 
highway or bridge, or to charge tolls for such facilities. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 43-3-202.5 
Authorizes the state DOT to make or enter into contracts or agreements 
with one or more public or private entities to design, finance, construct, 
operate, maintain, reconstruct or improve a turnpike project by means of 
a public-private initiative. Finds that privately-developed transportation 
projects can result in time and cost savings, risk reduction and new tax 
revenues. Requires that the public or private entity secure and maintain 
liability insurance coverage. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 43-4-413-414 
Authorizes the Transportation Commission, with the approval of the 
governor, to enter into a contract with a private individual, firm or 
corporation for construction, maintenance and operation of one or more 
toll tunnels. Requires all rates for tolls or fees to be charged by a private 
contractor to first be approved by the commission. 
Colo. Rev. Stat §§ 
43-4-801 to 812 
Creates and authorizes a Statewide Bridge Enterprise to enter into P3s to 
design, develop, construct, reconstruct, repair, operate or maintain bridge 
projects. Also creates the High-Performance Transportation Enterprise 
(HPTE) to seek out and enter into P3s and other innovative means of 
completing surface transportation infrastructure projects. Both 
enterprises shall operate as government owned businesses within the 
state DOT. 








Table 44  Connecticut P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 4-255 to 4-263 
This statute authorizes the Governor to approve up to 5 projects to be 
implemented as P3 projects prior to January 2016. Eligible facilities 
include early childcare, educational, health or housing; transportation 
systems including ports, transit-oriented development; or any other 
facility designated by an act of the General Assembly. The statute limits 
state support of a partnership agreement to 25% of the cost of the 
project. 








Table 45  Delaware P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Del. Cod. Ann. 
Tit. 2, §§ 2001 to 
2012 
Comprehensive statute that authorizes P3s for transportation projects. 
Authorizes the secretary of transportation to enter into agreements with 
private entities to study, plan, design, construct, lease, finance, operate, 
maintain, repair and/or expand transportation systems. Establishes the 
Public-Private Initiatives Program Revolving Loan Fund, which provides 
funds for financing such projects. Allows for solicited and unsolicited 
proposals. 








Table 46  Florida P3 Statute (1 of 2) 
Statute Summary 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
334.30 
Comprehensive statute that authorizes P3s for transportation projects. 
Authorizes the state DOT, with legislative approval, to enter into 
agreements with private entities to build, operate, own or finance 
transportation facilities. Creates evaluation criteria for such projects. 
Prohibits noncompete clauses. Exempts private entities from certain 
taxes. Allows the DOT to lease existing toll facilities (except the Florida 
Turnpike System) through P3s with legislative approval; the DOT also 
may develop new toll facilities or increase capacity on existing toll 
facilities through P3s. Requires provisions in the P3 agreement that 
ensure a negotiated portion of revenues from tolled or fare generating 
projects are returned to the DOT over the life of the agreement. Allows a 
private entity to impose tolls or fares, subject to DOT regulation and 
certain limits. Allows for availability payments or shadow tolls, subject 
to annual appropriation by the Legislature. Limits P3 terms to no more 
than 50 years; however, the secretary of transportation may authorize a 
term of up to 75 years, and the Legislature may approve a term 
exceeding 75 years. Limits the total obligations for all projects under this 
section to no more than 15 percent of total federal and state funding for 
the State Transportation Trust Fund in any given year. Allows for 
solicited and unsolicited proposals. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
337.251 
Authorizes the state DOT to lease to public or private entities, for a term 
not to exceed 99 years, the use of DOT property, including rights-of-
way. Also authorizes the DOT to lease the use of areas above or below 
state highways or other transportation facilities for commercial purposes. 
Leases under this section may not interfere with the primary state 
transportation needs nor be contrary to the best interests of the public. 
Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
338.22 to 2511 
Creates the Florida Turnpike Enterprise, which operates like private-
sector business within the state DOT, in order to plan, develop, own, 
purchase, lease or otherwise acquire, demolish, construct, improve, 
relocate, equip, repair, maintain, operate and manage the Florida 
Turnpike System. Allows the enterprise to cooperate, coordinate, partner 
and contract with other entities, public and private, to accomplish its 
purposes. 





Table 47  Florida P3 Statute (2 of 2) 
Statute Summary 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
343.962 
Tampa Bay Area Regional Transportation Authority Act authorizes the 
regional transportation authority to receive or solicit proposals and enter 
into agreements with private entities or consortia thereof for the 
building, operation, ownership, or financing of multimodal 
transportation systems, transit-oriented development nodes, transit 
stations, or related facilities 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
343.875 
Authorizes the Northwest Florida Transportation Corridor Authority to 
enter into agreements with private entities to build, operate, own or 
finance transportation facilities within its jurisdiction. Sets criteria for 
proposed projects. Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. Allows 
a private entity to impose tolls or fares, but rates and use of funds must 
be regulated by the authority to avoid unreasonable costs to facility 
users. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
348.0004 
Authorizes any expressway authority, transportation authority, bridge 
authority or toll authority to enter into agreements with private entities to 
build, operate, own or finance transportation facilities within the 
jurisdiction of the authority. Creates evaluation criteria for such projects. 
Prohibits noncompete clauses. Allows a private entity to impose tolls or 
fares, but rates and use of funds must be regulated by the authority to 
avoid unreasonable costs to the users of the facility. Requires all P3 
facilities to be consistent with state, regional and local comprehensive 
plans. Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 
Fla. Stat. Ann § 
287.05712 
County, municipality, or special district has authority to establish P3 for 
project that serves a public purpose, including, but not limited to, any 
ferry or mass transit facility, vehicle parking facility, airport or seaport 
facility, rail facility or project, fuel supply facility, oil or gas pipeline, 
medical or nursing care facility, recreational facility, sporting or cultural 
facility, or educational facility or other building or facility that is used or 
will be used by a public educational institution, or any other public 
facility or infrastructure that is used or will be used by the public at large 
or in support of an accepted public purpose or activity. The statute 
describes the project qualification process and procurement procedures, 
including the development of interim and comprehensive agreements. 
Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 
Fla. Stat. Ann § 
255.065 
Exempts unsolicited proposals for P3 projects from public record and 
public meeting requirements for 180 days after receipt, if the public 
entity does not issue a competitive solicitation, or until the end of any 
competitive solicitation or promptly reissued competitive solicitation. 
These temporary exemptions are intended to protect the P3 process by 
"encouraging private entities to submit such proposals, which will 
facilitate the timely development and operation of a qualifying project." 








Table 48  Georgia P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Ga. Code Ann. 
§48-5-41; Ga. 
Code Ann. §48- 5-
421.1 
This statute exempts property that qualifies as a public-private 
transportation project from ad valorem taxes, and section 48-5-421.1 
provides that such projects shall not constitute special franchises. 
Ga. Code Ann. § 
32-10-76 
This statute establishes a grant program for P3 streetcar development and 
provides assistance to local government entities. 
Ga. Code Ann. 
§32-2-41(b)(6) 
This statute allows the commissioner to establish a Public-Private 
Initiatives Division within the state DOT. 
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 
32-2-78 to 80 
Authorizes the DOT to solicit and accept proposals for projects that are 
funded or financed in part or in whole by private sources. Require all 
future P3 projects to be solicited by the DOT. Include public comment 
requirements and criteria for the DOT to use in awarding contracts. 
Authorizes contracts to include tolls, fares, or other user fees and tax 
increments for use of the project. Final approval of P3 contracts shall be 
by action of the State Transportation Board. 
Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 
36-91-110 to 36-
91-118 
The Partnership for Public Facilities and Infrastructure Act establishes 
guidelines for local government for P3 procurement. The statute also 
outlines procedures for the review and analysis of each proposal. 
'Qualifying project' means any project selected in response to a request 
from a local government or submitted by a private entity as an 
unsolicited proposal and subsequently reviewed and approved by a local 
government, within its sole discretion, as meeting a public purpose or 
public need. This term shall not include and shall have no application to 
any project involving a) the generation of electric energy for sale, b) 
communication services, c) cable and video services, d) water reservoir 
projects. 








Table 49  Illinois P3 Statute (1 of 2) 
Statute Summary 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 
20, § 2705/2705-
450 
Authorizes the state DOT to enter into agreements with any public or 
private entity for the purpose of promoting and developing high-speed 
rail and magnetic levitation transportation within the state.  
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 
620 § 75/2-35 
The South Suburban Airport Act provides gives general powers to the 
airport authority, specifically for P3. Any combination of design, build, 
finance, operate, and maintain are authorized. The term of a P3 
agreement is lifted to 75 years, though the term may be extended by the 
General Assembly by law. The statute describes the prequalification and 
procurement processes. The statute also describes the provisions to be 
included in the P3 agreement. The P3 developer is unable to impose user 
fees outside of the P3 agreement. 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 
605, § 5/10-802 
Authorizes municipalities to make contracts "of every kind and nature" 
to acquire, construct, reconstruct, improve, enlarge, better, operate, 
maintain and/or repair any bridge within five miles of the corporate 
limits of the municipality, and to fix and apply tolls and fees for use of 
such a bridge. 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 
605 §§ 130/1 to 
130/999 
Authorizes the state DOT to enter into a P3 to develop, construct, 
manage or operate the Illiana Expressway. Limits the contract term to 99 
years, including extensions. Requires legislative approval for all 
extensions. Chapter 820 section 130/2 makes a P3 for the Illiana 
Expressway subject to the state Prevailing Wage Act (this section is also 
applicable to a lease of facility property at Chicago Midway 
International Airport). 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 
630 §§ 15/5 
The Public-Private Partnership Act provides broad authority for the 
development of new P3 projects by the DOT and Tollway Authority. 
Eligible projects include roads, bridges, intermodal facilities, intercity or 
high-speed passenger rail or other transportation facilities. Airports and 
toll roads are not eligible unless authorized by law. The Act can be 
applied toward reconstruction or expansion of existing assets. The Act 
describes project identification processes and the need for legislative 
authorization by joint resolution of the Illinois House and Senate. The 
Act describes three types of procurement processes: sealed bidding, 
sealed proposals, and design-build. A preferred proponent's proposal will 
be reviewed by the State's Commission on Government Forecasting and 
Accountability. The Governor makes the final award decision. 





Table 50  Illinois P3 Statute (2 of 2) 
Statute Summary 
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 
5-23-1-1 to 5-23-
7-2 
Authorizes governmental bodies to enter into P3 agreements with private 
entities for the acquisition, planning, design, development, 
reconstruction, repair, maintenance or financing of public facilities. 
Applies to the state, a political subdivision in a county containing a 
consolidated city, or a political subdivision in a county that adopts these 
provisions by resolution or ordinance. Limits original terms of P3 
agreements to no more than five years with board approval; a term in 
excess of five years requires approval from the board, the governor 
and/or the fiscal body of a political subdivision. Requires a public 
hearing. Allows for solicited proposals only. 









Table 51  Indiana P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 
5-23-1-1 to 5-23-
7-2 
Authorizes governmental bodies to enter into P3 agreements with private 
entities for the acquisition, planning, design, development, 
reconstruction, repair, maintenance or financing of public facilities. 
Applies to the state, a political subdivision in a county containing a 
consolidated city, or a political subdivision in a county that adopts these 
provisions by resolution or ordinance. Limits original terms of P3 
agreements to no more than five years with board approval; a term in 
excess of five years requires approval from the board, the governor 
and/or the fiscal body of a political subdivision. Requires a public 
hearing. Allows for solicited proposals only. 
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 
8-15.5-1-1 to 8-
15.5-13-8 
Authorizes the Indiana Finance Authority to enter into P3 agreements 
with private entities to plan, design, acquire, construct, reconstruct, 
improve, extend, expand, lease, operate, repair, manage, maintain or 
finance toll road projects. Prohibits the state DOT or the authority from 
issuing a request for proposals or entering into a P3 for a toll road after 
Aug. 1, 2006, unless the General Assembly adopts a statute authorizing 
the imposition of tolls. Exempts certain projects from the legislative 
approval requirement, including the Illiana Expressway under legislation 
enacted in 2010 (Senate Bill 382; 2010 Ind. Acts, P.L. 85). Requires 
public hearings to be held in affected counties; also requires certain 
preliminary studies. Limits lease terms to no more than 75 years. Allows 
for solicited proposals only. 
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 
8-15.7-1-1 to 8-
15.7-16-8 
Authorizes the state DOT to enter into P3s to develop, finance or operate 
transportation projects, including tollways, roads and bridges, and some 
rail projects. Prohibits the DOT or the Indiana Finance Authority from 
issuing a request for proposals or entering into a P3 agreement unless the 
General Assembly adopts a statute authorizing that activity. Exempts 
certain projects from the legislative approval requirement, including an 
Interstate 69 project and the Illiana Expressway under new legislation 
enacted in 2010 (Senate Bill 382; 2010 Ind. Acts, P.L. 85). Allows for 
solicited proposals only. 








Table 52  Kentucky P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 
45A.077 
The statute establishes an 11-member Kentucky Local Government 
Public Private Partnership, which will approve review and approve 
certain P3 agreements. The law also directs the Secretary of Finance and 
the Administration Cabinet to establish regulations in order to determine 
when a P3 may be used for a particular project, as well as those local 
governments must follow concerning P3 agreements. The law sets forth 
regulations as to what should be contained in an RFP and establishes 
procedures regarding unsolicited proposals. 








Table 53  Louisiana P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 48:250 
Authorizes the DOT to solicit and enter P3 contracts for a transportation 
facility. Twenty-five percent of P3 projects undertaken by the DOT 
should be located outside the boundaries of a metro area. Rural projects 
are subject to approval of the House and Senate committee on 
agriculture and rural development. 
La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 48:1660.1 
Competitive bidding on contracts provides broad authority to the 
Regional Transit Authority to enter into P3 contracts for transportation 
facilities. RTA is unable to accept an unsolicited proposal. The statute 
refers to the procedural requirements previously enacted. 
La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§48:2020 to 
2037 
Encourages parishes and municipalities to use P3s to help the state 
finance improvements to the state highway system and meet local 
transportation needs. Authorizes parishes and municipalities to create 
transportation authorities, which may enter into agreements with public 
or private entities to construct, maintain, repair and/or operate 
transportation projects. Allows transportation authorities to authorize 
investment of public and private money to finance such projects, subject 
to compliance with state law relative to use of public funds. 
La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§48:2071 to 
2074; La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. 
§48:2077; La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§48:2084 to 
2084.15 
Creates the Louisiana Transportation Authority to pursue alternative and 
innovative funding sources - including P3s, tolls and unclaimed property 
bonds - to supplement public revenue sources and to improve Louisiana's 
transportation system. Allows the authority to contract with a public or 
private entity to construct, maintain, repair or operate authority projects, 
and to authorize the investment of public and private money to finance 
such projects, subject to compliance with state law relative to the use of 
public funds. Allows a private entity to impose user fees, but prohibits a 
private entity from imposing tolls or user fees on any existing free 
transportation facility unless the facility is improved or expanded. 
Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 








Table 54  Maine P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. Title 23, § 
4251 
Authorizes the state DOT - with legislative approval - to enter into P3s 
for transportation projects with an estimated cost of more than $25 
million or when a project proposal includes tolling existing 
transportation facilities that were not previously subject to tolls. Allows 
for solicited and unsolicited proposals. Sets standards and requirements 
for P3 proposals, including completion of certain studies. Requires P3 
proposals to limit the use of state capital funding to less than 50 percent 
of the initial capital cost of the facility and, to the extent practicable 
minimize use of public transportation funding sources. Allows a P3 
agreement to authorize a private entity to impose tolls or fares, subject to 
certain requirements. Limits term length to 50 years unless the 
Legislature, upon the recommendation of the commissioner of 
transportation, approves a longer term. 








Table 55  Maryland P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Md. Code Regs. § 
23.3.05.05 
County or local educational agencies can establish P3 for shared use 
arrangements of school facilities in exchange for school property 
enhancements and/or revenue 
Md. Code Ann., 
State Fin. & Proc. 
§§ 10a-101 to 10a-
403 
Statute provides authority to reporting agencies to State Finance and 
Procurement to pursue P3 project delivery. The statute allows agencies 
to determine their own regulations and processes for the procurement, 
development and delivery of P3 projects. Eligible projects are those that 
"develop and strengthen a public infrastructure asset in conjunction with 
a public-private partnership." 
Md. Code Regs. 
§§ 11.07.06.01 to 
14 
The law establishes a Maryland Transportation Authority program for 
P3. It describes the steering committee, identification process, screening 
process, procurement steps, and delivery procedures. Allows for 
unsolicited proposals only. 








Table 56  Massachusetts P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. Ch. 6C, §§1 
to 74 
Massachusetts DOT may solicit proposals and enter into contracts for 
design-build-finance-operate-maintain or design-build-operate-maintain 
services with the responsible and responsive offeror submitting the 
proposal that is most advantageous to the department through the sale, 
lease, operation and maintenance of a transportation facility within the 
commonwealth. A Special Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure 
Oversight Commission is established, which must comment on and 
approve all requests for proposals. 








Table 57  Michigan P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Mich. Comp. 
Laws § 124.401 to 
426 
This statute provides broad procurement authority to metro 
transportation authorities to implement P3 for transportation facilities. 
Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §§ 
125.1871 to 
125.1883 
The Private Investment Infrastructure Funding Act authorizes the 
department of transportation, county road commission, drain 
commissioner, city, village or township with jurisdiction of a public 
facility to establish a negotiating partnership to develop and finance 
public facilities. While not explicitly recognizing P3 in the traditional 
sense, this has allowed agencies to negotiate with private entities on the 
development and financing of public facilities. 








Table 58  Minnesota P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 160.84 to 98 
This statute generally authorizes state and local road authorities to solicit 
or accept proposals from and enter into development agreements with 
private entities to develop, finance, design, construct, improve, 
rehabilitate, own and/or operate toll facilities. It also authorizes user fees 
for as high-occupancy vehicle lanes or dynamic shoulder lanes. The 
extent to which a private entity can operate and maintain a road is 
significantly limited. Section 160.845 prohibits a road authority or a 
private operator from converting, transferring or utilizing any portion of 
a highway to impose tolls or for use as a toll facility (excepting dynamic 
shoulder lanes or HOV/HOT lanes); and section 160.98 prohibits a road 
authority from selling, leasing, executing a development agreement for a 
build-operate-transfer or build-transfer-operate facility that transfers an 
existing highway lane, or otherwise relinquishing management of a 
highway. 








Table 59  Mississippi P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Miss. Code Ann. 
§§ 65-43-1 to 85 
Authorizes the Mississippi Transportation Commission, county boards of 
supervisors and/or the governing authorities of municipalities to contract 
with other governmental agencies or private entities for the purpose of 
designing, financing, constructing, operating and maintaining one or 
more new toll roads or toll bridges in the state. Prohibits noncompete 
clauses by authorizing toll roads or bridges at and along only those 
locations where an alternate un-tolled route exists. Limits contract terms 
to 50 years, which cannot be extended or renewed. Allows for solicited 
and unsolicited proposals. 








Table 60  Missouri P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 
227.600 to 669 
The Missouri Public-Private Partnerships Transportation Act authorizes 
the Highways and Transportation Commission to enter into agreements 
with private partners to finance, develop and/or operate any pipeline, 
ferry, river port, airport, railroad, light rail or other mass transit facility. 
Any project not mentioned previously cannot be financed, developed or 
operated by a private partner until it is approved by a vote of the people. 
Allows for solicited and unsolicited projects. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 
238.300 to 367 
Authorizes creation of special purpose, nonprofit "transportation 
corporations" by private parties, which may enter into agreements with 
the Highways and Transportation Commission in order to fund, promote, 
plan, design, construct, maintain and operate one or more transportation 
projects. Authorizes such corporations to issue bonds and to establish 
and charge user fees for projects. No part of the earnings or assets of a 
transportation corporation shall inure to the benefit of any private 
interests, person or entity. 








Table 61  New Jersey P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Statute to be 
determined; SB 
865 
This law authorizes local government entities to enter into P3 
agreements for the "development, construction, reconstruction, repair, 
alteration, improvement, extension, operation, and maintenance of any 
building, road, structure, infrastructure, or facility constructed or 
acquired by a local government unit to house local government 
functions, including any infrastructure or facility used or to be used by 
the public or in support of a public purpose or activity; provided that, 
with respect to a roadway or highway project, a qualifying project shall 
include an expenditure of at least $10 million in public funds, or any 
expenditure in solely private funds." P3 lease terms are limited to 30 
years. Qualifying projects will be submitted to the New Jersey Economic 
Development Authority for its review and approval. The law allows for 
unsolicited proposals. 








Table 62  Nevada P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 
338.161 to 167 
The law authorizes counties with a population exceeding 700,000 to 
enter into P3s for transportation projects, including mass transit 
facilities. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 
338.161 to 168 
Allows private entities to submit a request to a public body to develop, 
construct, improve, maintain or operate, or any combination thereof, a 
transportation facility. Excludes toll roads and toll bridges. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Chapter 277A 
This statute defines powers for regional transportation commissions and 
section 280 allows for the use of turnkey procurement and competitive 
negotiation procurement processes. 








Table 63  New Hampshire P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
NH Rev. Stat. 
Ann. 228:107 to 
228:115 
Establishes a P3 oversight commission to recommend projects to the 
transportation commissioner using DBFOM or DBOM delivery models. 
The commission functions as an advisory board during P3 project 
implementation by helping to develop the RFP and preparation of 
agreements. 








Table 64  North Carolina P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
NC Gen. Stat. § 
136-18 
Allows the state DOT to enter into a contract with a private developer to 
accomplish the engineering, design or construction of improvements to 
any transportation infrastructure under its jurisdiction. Sets restrictions 
on such projects, including that DOT participation is limited to the lesser 
of 10 percent of the engineering contract and any construction contract 
or $250,000, and that, in any case, DOT costs must not exceed normal 
practices. Requires projects to be constructed in accordance with DOT-
approved plans and specifications. Terms must be less than 50 years. 
Solicited proposals only. 
NC Gen. Stat. §§ 
136-89.180 to 198 
Authorizes the North Carolina Turnpike Authority to enter into 
agreements with the state DOT, political subdivisions and private 
entities, and to expend such funds as it deems necessary pursuant to such 
agreements, to finance the acquisition, construction, equipping, 
operation or maintenance of any turnpike project. Authorizes the 
authority to fix and collect tolls and fees for the use of a turnpike project. 
Prohibits noncompete clauses by requiring the DOT to maintain an 
existing, alternate, comparable non-toll route corresponding to each 
turnpike project constructed pursuant to this article. Allows the authority 
to study, plan and conduct preliminary design work on up to nine 
projects and then to design, establish, purchase, construct, operate and 
maintain five identified projects only. Any additional projects require 
legislative approval. 








Table 65  Ohio P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 5501.71 to 
5501.75 
This statute defines the authority of the state DOT to enter public-private 
initiatives, including guidelines for solicitation and selection. The state 
DOT can use P3 for public or private highway, road, street, parkway, 
public transit, aviation, or rail project, and any related rights-of-way, 
bridges or tunnels. The DOT may use sealed bidding and the selection of 
proposals using qualifications or best value (or both). 








Table 66  Oklahoma P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Okla. Code Ann. 
Tit. 74 § 5151 to 
5158 
The Oklahoma Public and Private Facilities and Infrastructure Act 
establishes a Partnership Committee to determine potential P3 projects. 
The statute requires that the Committee provide a public sector 
comparator for each project. The Oklahoma Office of P3 is responsible 
for procurement practices. The state DOT and Turnpike Authority are 
exempt from the law. 








Table 67  Oregon P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 
184.631 
OR DOT's Research and Development Program can use P3 for state 
highways 
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 
367.800 to 826 
Establishes the Oregon Innovative Partnerships Program within the state 
DOT, which is authorized to enter into agreements with private entities 
to plan, acquire, finance, develop, design, construct, reconstruct, replace, 
improve, maintain, manage, repair, lease and/or operate transportation 
projects. Lists specific goals for the program, including to speed project 
delivery, maximize innovation and develop partnerships with private 
entities. Lists specific requirements for P3 agreements, including 
financing, risk management, penalties for nonperformance and 
incentives for performance. Allows for solicited and unsolicited 
proposals. 
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 
383.001 to 075 
Authorizes the state DOT to enter into agreements with private entities 
and/or units of government to acquire, design, construct, reconstruct, 
operate or maintain and repair tollway projects. Includes lease 
agreements. Allows the DOT or a private entity that operates a tollway 
project pursuant to an agreement with the DOT to impose and collect 
tolls. Allows for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 








Table 68  Pennsylvania P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Penn. Conso. 
Stat.74 §§ 9101 to 
9124 
The law allows state or local public entities to enter into P3s for the 
design, construction, operation, maintenance, financing or lease of 
transportation facilities. All partnerships must be approved by a Public-
Private Transportation Partnerships Board. The bill also allows the 
legislature to block P3s for state-owned facilities and requires legislative 
approval for P3s on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. 








Table 69  South Carolina P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
SC Code Ann. 
§§57-5-1310 to 
1495 
Allows the state DOT to construct and operate turnpike facilities. 
Section 57-5-1330(1)(4) appears to allow the use of P3s for these 
facilities by allowing the DOT to exercise such authorizations as are 
granted by the provisions in other statute law to designate, establish, 
plan, abandon, improve, construct, maintain and regulate turnpike 
facilities. 
SC Code § 57-3-
200 
Authorizes the state DOT to expend such funds as it deems necessary to 
enter into partnership agreements with private entities to finance, by tolls 
and other methods, the cost of acquiring, constructing, equipping, 
maintaining and operating highways, roads, streets and bridges in the 
state. 
SC Code Ann. 
§§57-5-1310 to 
1495 
Allows the state DOT to construct and operate turnpike facilities. 
Section 57-5-1330(1)(4) appears to allow the use of P3s for these 
facilities by allowing the DOT to exercise such authorizations as are 
granted by the provisions in other statute law to designate, establish, 
plan, abandon, improve, construct, maintain and regulate turnpike 
facilities. 








Table 70  Tennessee P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Tenn. Code §§ 54-
3-101 to 54-3-113 
Authorizes tolling as an additional and alternative method for funding or 
financing transportation facilities. Authorizes the state DOT to enter into 
agreements with private parties to develop or operate a tollway, toll 
facility or any part thereof. Limits authorization for tolling initially to a 
pilot program of two projects. Provides that existing highways cannot be 
converted into toll roads, but additional lane capacity constructed on or 
along an existing highway or bridge may be developed and operated like 
a tollway. Requires legislative approval. 
Tenn. Code §§ 54-
6-101 to 54-6-121 
This law enables the DOT to use P3 delivery for a tollway or toll facility. 
The law outlines procedures for project procurement, and the metrics 
that the DOT may consider when evaluating a proposal. Allows for 
unsolicited proposals. 
Tenn. Code §§ 54-
3-101 to 54-3-113 
Authorizes tolling as an additional and alternative method for funding or 
financing transportation facilities. Authorizes the state DOT to enter into 
agreements with private parties to develop or operate a tollway, toll 
facility or any part thereof. Limits authorization for tolling initially to a 
pilot program of two projects. Provides that existing highways cannot be 
converted into toll roads, but additional lane capacity constructed on or 
along an existing highway or bridge may be developed and operated like 
a tollway. Requires legislative approval. 












Code Ann. §§ 
222.001 to 107 
Agreements with private entities for design, financing, maintenance, 
operation, or construction—including oversight and inspection—of a toll 
or non-toll facility on the state highway system, where the private or 
public entity is paid pass-through tolls 
Texas 
Transportation 
Code Ann. §§ 
91.054; §§ 
223.201 to 210; 
Ch. 228; §§ 
371.001 to 153 
Comprehensive development agreements with private entities to design, 
develop, finance, construct, maintain, repair, operate, extend or expand a 
toll project or a state highway improvement project that either includes 
both tolled and un-tolled lanes, is financed by private activity bonds, or 
in which the private entity has an interest.  Also allows agreements for 
financing, design, acquisition, construction, maintenance, or operation of 
a   
Texas 
Transportation 
Code Ann. §§ 
366.401 to 409; §§ 
371.001 to 153  
Comprehensive development agreements with private entities for at least 
the design, construction, rehabilitation, expansion or improvement of a 
turnpike project; also may include financing, acquisition, maintenance or 
operation of a turnpike project. 
Texas 
Transportation 
Code Ann. §§ 
370.305 to 317; §§ 
371.001 to 153 
Comprehensive Development Agreements with private entities for at 
least the design and construction of a transportation project; also may 
include financing, acquisition, maintenance, or operation of a 
transportation project. Projects may not be part of the state highway 
system unless agreed to by the authority and TxDOT  
Texas 
Transportation 
Code Ann. Ch. 
284 (Subject to 
Ch. 223 and Ch. 
366): §§ 371.001 
to 153 
Comprehensive Development Agreements with private entities to design, 
develop, finance, construct, maintain, repair, operate, extend, or expand 
a proposed or existing causeway, bridge, tunnel, turnpike, highway, or 
ferry project, to the extent and in the manner applicable to TxDOT under 
Ch. 223 and to Regional Tollway Authorities under Chapter 366. 
Projects may not be part of the state highway system unless agreed to by 
TxDOT. 








Table 72  Utah P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-6-503; § 




Authorizes the state DOT to accept proposals for, and enter into, tollway 
development agreements with public or private entities to study, 
predevelop, design, finance, acquire, construct, reconstruct, maintain, 
repair, operate, extend or expand tollway facilities. Defines the terms 
that must be included in such agreements. Tollway development 
agreements must be approved by the Utah Transportation Commission. 
Allow for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 




Authorizes the state DOT to establish, expand and operate tollways and 
related facilities. Authorizes the DOT to enter into contracts, agreements, 
licenses, franchises, tollway development agreements, or other 
arrangements for tollway projects. Prohibits the DOT or other entity 
from establishing or operating a tollway on an existing state highway 
unless approved by the Transportation Commission and the Legislature, 
except for high occupancy toll lanes or additional capacity lanes. 
Requires revenue generated from tollway development agreement 
projects to be deposited into the Tollway Special Revenue Fund created 
in section 72-2-120 and used for transportation facilities within the 
corridor served by the tollway, unless the revenue is to the private entity 
or identified for a different purpose under the agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-6-503; § 




Authorizes the state DOT to accept proposals for, and enter into, tollway 
development agreements with public or private entities to study, 
predevelop, design, finance, acquire, construct, reconstruct, maintain, 
repair, operate, extend or expand tollway facilities. Defines the terms 
that must be included in such agreements. Tollway development 
agreements must be approved by the Utah Transportation Commission. 
Allow for solicited and unsolicited proposals. 








Table 73  Virginia P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Va. Code §§ 33.2-
1800 
The Public-Private Transportation Act of 1995 (subsequently modified) 
is a comprehensive P3 statute intended to encourage private investment 
in transportation facilities. Authorizes a private entity to develop and/or 
operate a qualifying transportation facility, subject to approval from and 
a comprehensive agreement with the responsible public entity. Contains 
detailed implementation guidelines, including specific requirements for 
comprehensive agreements. Stipulates the powers and duties of a private 
entity in a P3 and provides financing mechanisms. Allows for solicited 
and unsolicited proposals. 








Table 74  Washington P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Wash. Rev. Code 
§§ 47.29.010 to 
900 
Authorizes the state DOT to enter into P3s for transportation projects, 
whether capital or operating, where the state's primary purpose for the 
project is to facilitate safe transportation of people or goods via any 
mode of travel. Defines terms that must be included in agreements. 
Requires review by and approval of the Transportation Commission for 
P3 contracts or agreements. Requires an advisory committee for any 
project that costs $300 million or more. Authorizes the DOT to solicit or 
accept unsolicited proposals after Jan. 1, 2007, for eligible transportation 
projects. 








Table 75  West Virginia P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
WVa. Code §§ 17-
28-1 to 12 
Authorizes Division of Highways to enter into comprehensive 
agreements with private entities to acquire, construct or improve 
transportation facilities. Sets guidelines for soliciting proposals. 
Specifies what comprehensive agreements shall contain. Allows a 
private developer to charge user fees if they are consistent with the rate 
of return specified in the agreement; requires the schedule and amount of 
initial user fees and any fee increase to be approved by the 
Commissioner of the Division of Highways. Original bill expired in 
2011 and was reenacted in 2013. 








Table 76  Wisconsin P3 Statute 
Statute Summary 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
84.01 (30) 
Authorizes the state DOT to enter into build-operate-lease or transfer 
agreements with private entities for construction of transportation 
projects and for maintenance or operation of projects that are not 
purchased by the state upon their completion. Lists specific provisions 
that must be included in every agreement. An agreement may not be 
entered into unless the DOT determines that it advances the public 
interest and the private entity meets certain criteria. 
Source: (USDOT FHWA 2018c) 
 
